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TAX NOW OR TAX NEVER:
POLITICAL OPTIONALITY AND THE CASE FOR
CURRENT-ASSESSMENT TAX REFORM*
DAVID GAMAGE & JOHN R. BROOKS**
The U.S. income tax system is broken. Due to the realization doctrine and
taxpayers’ consequent ability to defer taxation of gains, taxpayers can easily
minimize or avoid the taxation of investment income, a failure that is magnified
many times over when considering the ultra-wealthy. As a result, this small
group of taxpayers commands an enormous share of national wealth yet pays
paltry taxes relative to the economic income their wealth produces—a
predicament that this Article condemns as being economically, politically, and
socially harmful.
The conventional view among tax law experts has assumed that the problems
created by the realization doctrine can be fixed on the back end by adjusting the
rules that govern taxation at the time of realization. Specifically, most tax
scholars have favored reform proposals that would retain the realization doctrine
while aiming to impose taxes in a way that would erase or reduce the financial
benefits of deferral. Examples include retrospective capital gains tax reforms,
progressive consumption tax reforms, and more incremental reforms such as
ending stepped-up basis.
However, this Article argues that these future-assessment reform proposals
ignore a crucial additional problem of deferral—political optionality. If there is
a many-year or longer gap between when either income is earned or wealth is
* © 2022 David Gamage & John R. Brooks.
** David Gamage, Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington, Maurer School of Law;
John R. Brooks, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The authors thank Lily
Batchelder, Thomas Brennan, Allison Christians, Heather Field, Victor Fleischer, Pamela Foohey,
Benjamin Leff, Mary Margaret Frank, Louis Fuentes-Rohwer, Brian Galle, Nicholas Georgakopoulos,
Mark Gergen, Ariel Glogower, Daniel Hemel, Kristin Hickman, Edward Kleinbard, Leandra
Lederman, Ruth Mason, Susan Morse, Jason Oh, Ted Seto, Darien Shanske, Daniel Shaviro, Michael
Simkovic, Sloan Speck, Clint Wallace, and the participants in the 2021 UCI Law Tax Policy
Colloquium, 2021 Colorado Law Faculty Workshop, Paul H. O’Neill School of Public and
Environmental Affairs Fifth Annual Public Finance Consortium, 2021 University of Minnesota Law
Perspective on Taxation Lecture Series, 2020 AMT Symposium, 2020 IU-Maurer Law Faculty
Workshop, 2020 BYU Law Tax Policy Colloquium, 2019 National Tax Association Annual Meeting,
2019 UVA Law Invitational Tax Conference, 2019 IU-McKinney Law Faculty Workshop, and 2018
AMT Symposium for valuable comments and advice. The authors also thank Jacob Davis and
Cassandra Thompson for helpful research assistance.

100 N.C. L. REV. 487 (2022)

488

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

accrued and when tax is assessed, then any number of things can happen in the
interim to undermine the eventual assessment and collection of tax. This Article
explains three sets of pressures that tend to erode future-assessment reforms over
time: (1) policy drift and the need for incremental bolstering of tax reforms, (2)
the time value of options, and (3) federal budget rules and related political
incentives.
By contrast to future-assessment reforms, this Article explains how currentassessment reforms—like wealth tax or accrual-income tax reform proposals—
are relatively resistant to these pressures. As this Article demonstrates, both
theory and historical experience reveal that future-assessment reforms are fragile
and often fail—and that ultra-wealthy taxpayers are well aware of this.
Therefore, accounting for the implications of political optionality, only currentassessment reforms are likely to succeed at meaningfully taxing the ultra-wealthy
and fixing the personal tax system.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. tax system does a very poor job of taxing the ultra-wealthy.1
Consider, for example, Larry Ellison—the founder and still largest shareholder
of the software company Oracle, whose net worth as of September 2021 was in
the neighborhood of $118 billion, making him the seventh-richest person in the
world.2 Ellison has used this wealth to, among other things, build a $270 million
yacht3 and a $200 million home (one of many),4 and buy the Hawaiian island
of Lanai for $300 million.5 Of course, it is not surprising that a person with
wealth like that spends it accordingly—except that Ellison famously has sold
very little of his Oracle stock.6 And for a long time, he had a base salary of only
$1 per year as CEO of Oracle.7 So where does the spending money come from?
He fuels this consumption out of a $10 billion personal credit line.8

1. See, e.g., Ari Glogower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2018) (“With these
changes, Congress has taken a hammer to a progressive income tax system that was already broken.”);
Mark P. Gergen, How To Tax Capital, 70 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2016) (“It is well known that the existing
system in the United States for taxing capital income is a mess.”); Edward J. McCaffery, A New
Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 920 (2005) [hereinafter McCaffery, A New Understanding
of Tax] (“Taxes on capital are easily avoided and virtually voluntary.”). As we will elaborate on in
Section I.A, we use the phrase “ultra-wealthy” to refer to households in the top 0.1% (more or less) of
wealth in the United States, a group that is estimated to consist of approximately 175,000 households
who collectively own between 15% and 20% of national wealth.
2. #7 Larry Ellison, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/profile/larry-ellison [https://perma.cc/
N5Y9-97CR] (Sept. 9, 2021).
3. Barry Pickthall, Allen vs. Ellison, YACHTING (Oct. 3, 2007), https://www.yachtingmagazine.
com/allen-vs-ellison [https://perma.cc/UL72-JZ5X].
4. The World’s Most Expensive Billionaire Homes, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2013, 10:31 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/pictures/mhj45edfjh/ellison-estate-woodside-calif/?sh=5fa867217434 [https:/
/perma.cc/6KZS-NZ6L].
5. Duane Shimogawa, PBN Confirms Amount Billionaire Larry Ellison Paid for Hawaiian Island of
Lanai, PAC. BUS. NEWS, https://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/blog/2016/01/pbn-confirms-amountbillionaire-larry-ellison-paid.html [https://perma.cc/2FB8-BMLK] (Jan. 8, 2016, 9:02 AM).
6. See, e.g., Julie Bort, Larry Ellison Has Secured $10 Billion Worth of Credit for His Personal
Spending, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2014, 7:29 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/larry-ellison-hasa-10b-credit-line-2014-9 [https://perma.cc/X33H-YXMC (dark archive)]; Robert Frank, How Larry
Ellison Actually Funds His Lavish Lifestyle, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/id/49194482 [https://
perma.cc/L6WY-Q7A9] (Sept. 27, 2012, 2:55 PM).
7. See, e.g., Rachel Gillett & Marissa Perino, 13 Top Executives Who Earn a $1 Salary or Less, BUS.
INSIDER (July 22, 2019, 2:20 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ceos-who-take-1-dollar-salary-orless-2015-8 [https://perma.cc/3UHW-VLEE]. To be clear, Ellison still takes home plenty in stock
options, in-kind payments, bonuses, and other compensation.
8. Caleb Melby, Billionaire Ellison Boosts Credit Line to $10.8 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2015,
4:59 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-25/billionaire-ellison-boosts-oracle-
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Why would one of the richest men in the world take on such debt? Selling
just a fraction of his stock would pay for all of his purchases and more. The
answer is simple: taxes.9 At today’s capital gains rates,10 selling the stock
necessary to cover that potential $10 billion of spending would mean cutting a
check to the federal government for over $2 billion. Instead, Ellison is taking
advantage of one of the most powerful tax avoidance strategies that exists—
simply not realizing gain. Ellison, or his estate, will eventually have to pay any
borrowed money back. Nevertheless, by deferring any realization of gain until
some theoretical future date, Ellison has at least lowered—or likely wiped out
entirely—any tax due.11
Most Americans predominantly earn wage and salary income, which the
U.S. income tax measures reasonably well.12 By contrast, the ultra-wealthy
predominantly earn income that arises from the returns to owning wealth (or
that can be made to appear as though it arises from the returns to owning
wealth),13 which the U.S. income tax system measures dreadfully.14 Because the
U.S. income tax system is so bad at reaching the returns to owning wealth,15 an
ultra-wealthy person could, to a first approximation, earn over $10 billion and
spend it on islands and yachts without ever paying income tax.
This deep failure of the U.S. income tax system has implications beyond
just the windfall for the ultra-wealthy. As we will explain,16 this state of affairs
credit-line-to-10-8-billion [https://perma.cc/8HCP-3VAC (staff-uploaded, dark archive)]; Bort, supra
note 6.
9. There may be some nontax reasons at play as well, including an interest in maintaining control
over Oracle, though as other technology entrepreneurs have shown, control can be managed in other
ways, such as through dual-class stock.
10. The top rate on capital gain income is 20%, I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D), or 23.8% including the tax
on net investment income, id. § 1411(a)(1). We assume Ellison’s basis is close to zero.
11. See, e.g., CHUCK MARR, SAMANTHA JACOBY & KATHLEEN BRYANT, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES, SUBSTANTIAL INCOME OF WEALTHY HOUSEHOLDS ESCAPES ANNUAL
TAXATION OR ENJOYS SPECIAL TAX BREAKS 8 (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/11-13-19tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/V453-6PZV].
12. Lily Batchelder & David Kamin, Taxing the Rich: Issues and Options 4 (Sept. 11, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452274 [https://perma.cc/9RHB-AD3Q].
13. There are a number of ways that labor or business income can be transformed into capital gain
in order to get more favorable tax treatment. For example, private equity fund managers receive capital
gain treatment of “carried interest,” even though carried interest is largely a payment for the managers’
services. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2008) [hereinafter Fleischer, Taxing Partnership Profits].
14. Id. at 4–7. Note that we use the phrases “investment income” and “returns to owning wealth”
interchangeably. See infra note 20.
15. For a summary of the economics research demonstrating this, see C. Eugene Steuerle,
Individuals Pay Very Little Individual Income Tax on Capital Income, TAXVOX (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/individuals-pay-very-little-individual-income-tax-capitalincome [https://perma.cc/4L8N-GL5S] [hereinafter Steuerle, Individuals Pay Very Little]. See also
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, 70 TAX L. REV. 305, 306 (2017) [hereinafter McCaffery,
Taxing Wealth Seriously].
16. See infra Part II.

100 N.C. L. REV. 487 (2022)

2022]

TAX NOW OR TAX NEVER

491

likely violates even the minimal fairness requirement that the personal income
tax not be regressive.17 This state of affairs also harms economic efficiency
because the tax-gaming techniques that the ultra-wealthy use to lower their tax
burdens are wasteful and economically damaging.18 Further, this state of affairs
undermines both the administrability and the integrity of the entire U.S. tax
system, as the tax system struggles to cope with the destructive effects of the
ultra-wealthy’s tax gaming. In a sense, the problems caused by the ultrawealthy’s tax gaming thus “trickle down,” creating harmful complexity, along
with traps for the unwary, that results in inefficiencies and unfairness affecting
many ordinary taxpayers.19
But why is the U.S. tax system so bad at measuring the economic income
of the ultra-wealthy? The chief reason is that the U.S. income tax is realizationbased and consequently allows tax on investment income to be deferred.20
Taxpayers have devised techniques, some very simple, some quite complex, for
delaying realization of their investment income so that the tax is not owed in
the years in which that income is earned or generated but is instead assessed
only at some future date or, often, never. As the economist C. Eugene Steuerle
has explained, “[most investment] income earned never is taxed at the
individual level, in part because assets are often not sold and their gains never
subject to income tax, in part because [investment] income benefits from a long
list of tax preferences, and in part because of outright evasion.”21

17. By “regressive” we mean where the share of a person’s income paid in taxes goes down as
income rises, which would be a violation of simple vertical equity. This is in contrast to the typical
“progressive” income tax, where the share of income paid in taxes increases as income rises. See, e.g.,
C. Eugene Steuerle, And Equal (Tax) Justice for All?, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 253,
268 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Steuerle, Equal (Tax) Justice].
18. As in prior work, we use the term “gaming” to include legal forms of tax avoidance, illegal
forms of tax evasion, and the large category of tax-planning transactions that are neither clearly legal
nor clearly illegal. See David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote Distributive Justice?: A
Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1, 5 n.18 (2014).
19. The use of “trickle down” here is a reference (and an admittedly snide reference) to trickledown economics. See generally Shu-Chun Susan Yang, Do Capital Income Tax Cuts Trickle Down?, 60
NAT’L TAX J. 551 (2007) (discussing trickle-down economics).
20. We use the terms “investment income” and “returns to owning wealth” interchangeably, using
both terms to refer to income that can be characterized as being derived from the returns to owning
wealth (as opposed to pure wage and salary income and the like), so that tax on this income can be
deferred under the rules of the existing U.S. income tax. We use these terms instead of the more
commonly used term “capital income” because the term “capital income” is used in disparate and often
inconsistent ways by different tax scholars and tax authorities. In particular, much of the income that
qualifies for deferral under the existing income tax falls outside of what economists would typically
consider to be “capital income.” See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV.
60, 62 (2011) (“When structured correctly, founders’ stock allows entrepreneurs to defer paying tax
until they sell the stock . . . .”); see also Fleischer, Taxing Partnership Profits, supra note 13, at 3 (“By
getting paid in part with carry instead of cash, fund managers defer the tax on income derived from
their human capital.”).
21. Steuerle, Individuals Pay Very Little, supra note 15.
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Many prominent tax reform proposals would seek to eliminate
opportunities for reducing or negating these deferred tax liabilities but retain
the realization doctrine. We call these future-assessment tax reform proposals.
The conventional thinking motivating these future-assessment reform
proposals is that deferral need not be a problem, in and of itself, so long as
deferred tax liabilities are eventually taxed at high enough rates to eliminate the
tax advantages from deferral.22 For instance, most of the major income tax
reform proposals would operate in this fashion, as would most of the major
consumption tax reform proposals, as well as most other proposals for what are
sometimes called “retrospective” style tax reforms.23 The theory is that if any
future tax would be the present-value equivalent of a current tax (which today
it is not), then the timing of the tax ought to be irrelevant.
As we argue here, however, the assumption that a future-assessed tax could
be as effective as a currently-assessed tax is deeply flawed. Instead, to
meaningfully tax the ultra-wealthy—and thereby start to repair our broken
income tax system—current-assessment tax reform is required.
By current assessment we mean any set of rules that actually collects tax in
the same time period in which income is earned or accrued, or alternatively, in
the same time period as when wealth or spending power is accumulated.

22. See Editorial Board, Opinion, The Smartest Way To Make the Rich Pay Is Not a Wealth Tax,
WASH. POST (July 21, 2021, 1:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/07/21/mosteffective-way-tax-rich-capital-gains/ [https://perma.cc/92GK-GYLC (dark archive)] (“Fortunately,
legitimate goals of a wealth tax can be achieved through other means, as the OECD report indicates.”).
23. See infra Part III for a discussion of retrospective capital gains tax, progressive consumption
tax reform proposals, and more incremental income tax reform proposals like ending stepped-up basis.
For other examples of “retrospective”-style tax reforms, see, for example, Greg Leiserson, Taxing
Wealth, in TACKLING THE TAX CODE: EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE WAYS TO RAISE REVENUE 89,
107–14 (Emily Moss, Jay Shambaugh & Ryan Nunn eds., 2020) (proposing both realization-based
accrual tax and realization-based wealth tax reforms); James Kwak, Reducing Inequality with a
Retrospective Tax on Capital, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 194 (2015) (proposing a “retrospective
capital tax”). Perhaps even more important than future-assessment approaches for fundamental tax
reforms, many scholars and commentators have argued that it would be better to just incrementally
patch the existing income tax by improving compliance and removing major loopholes—especially by
removing § 1014’s step-up in basis. But see infra Section III.C.3 (discussing why this approach would
likely fail). These more incremental approaches to reform would preserve the realization-based nature
of the income tax, and we thus consider these to be future-assessment approaches for reform. That is,
even though these reforms might limit deferral somewhat as compared to the status quo and thereby
make the income tax slightly less future-assessment oriented, these approaches would still mostly
maintain both deferral and the broader future-assessment nature of the income tax, making it
appropriate in our view to label these as future-assessment reforms. For examples of such incremental
reform proposals, see Natasha Sarin, Lawrence H. Summers & Joe Kupferberg, Tax Reform for
Progressivity: A Pragmatic Approach, in TACKLING THE TAX CODE: EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE
WAYS TO RAISE REVENUE, supra, at 317, 333; David Kamin, How To Tax the Rich, 146 TAX NOTES
119, 124–29 (2015).
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Examples include wealth taxes,24 mark-to-market25 or other accrual income
taxes,26 and even consumption taxes implemented along with prepayment or
withholding mechanisms.27
Central to any current-assessment system is the need to value assets at a
point prior to sale or other realization, so that any unrealized gain can be
measured and taxed.28 It is partially because of this need for asset valuation that
most tax policy scholars and tax reform advocates have disfavored currentassessment reforms.29 While the realization doctrine has historical roots in
outdated notions of what can be considered “income” (conceptually and for
purposes of the Sixteenth Amendment),30 the standard view today is that
realization is a “necessary evil” because it is difficult to do annual valuations of
relatively illiquid assets, such as shares in private corporations, partnership
interests, real estate, and artwork.31
These valuation and related problems present real and difficult challenges.
However, these challenges are surmountable, especially with regard to current24. A wealth tax, of course, does not tax income per se. But most proposals for annual wealth
taxes would tax an amount less than the average returns to wealth, and thus can be seen as a way for
the government to share in those returns as they accrue. This can be distinguished from one-time
confiscatory taxes, such as a well-functioning estate tax.
25. A “mark-to-market” tax system would include in income (or loss) all increases (or decreases)
in the value of assets held during the taxing period, regardless of whether those gains were realized
through a sale or exchange.
26. GREG LEISERSON & WILL MCGREW, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, TAXING
WEALTH BY TAXING INVESTMENT INCOME: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARK-TO-MARKET
TAXATION 4–5 (2019), https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/091119-mark-tomarket-ib.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM68-BGBT] (explaining mark-to-market and accrual approaches for
reform).
27. For an explanation of progressive consumption taxes, see infra Section III.B.2.
28. See David Gamage, Five Key Research Findings on Wealth Taxation for the Super Rich 14–
16 (July 27, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Gamage, Five Key Research Findings],
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427827 [https://perma.cc/L92R-ZS6R]; Ari Glogower, Taxing Capital
Appreciation, 70 TAX L. REV. 111, 133–42 (2016) [hereinafter Glogower, Taxing Capital Appreciation].
29. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Not So Fast: The Hidden Difficulties of Taxing Wealth, 58
NOMOS 261, 262 (2017) (“Not only is an annual wealth tax susceptible to constitutional challenges, for
example, but such a tax would be hobbled by valuation issues.”); Kamin, supra note 23, at 123 (“The
problem—one of several long-standing objections to mark-to-market accounting and annual wealth
taxes—is valuation.”); James R. Repetti, It’s All About Valuation, 53 TAX L. REV. 607, 608 (2000)
(“[V]aluation, which is the major difficulty in achieving an ideal income tax that periodically measures
accretions to wealth is also the major difficulty in achieving an ideal wealth tax.”).
30. “The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. For issues with what constitutes “income” for these
purposes, see, for example, Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206–09 (1920); John R. Brooks, The
Definitions of Income, 71 TAX L. REV. 253, 268 (2018) [hereinafter Brooks, Definitions of Income]; Edwin
R.A. Seligman, Are Stock Dividends Income?, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 517, 518 (1919).
31. David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (1998) (“[Realization]
is typically justified as a necessary evil, in that alternatives—such as taxing unrealized gains . . . are not
administrable or politically feasible.”).
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assessment reforms targeted at only the ultra-wealthy. Indeed, recent scholarly
and law-reform work shows how current-assessment reforms can be designed to
be superior at valuation as compared to the existing U.S. income tax.32 In any
case, there are a number of prior proposals that we think would do a sufficiently
decent job of mitigating these challenges while enacting reasonably effective
current-assessment reforms.33 The point being that solutions to these problems
exist, even if these solutions are not perfect. These proposals have different
strengths and weaknesses, and fully evaluating the advantages and
disadvantages of the various existing proposals for current-assessment reforms
is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article argues that we should
adopt one of these proposals, or else develop better ones, because a currentassessment reform is necessary to fix our broken income tax. We must tax now,
or else risk taxing never.
Current-assessment tax reform is needed because the U.S. political system
is not up to the task of maintaining a system for sufficiently taxing deferred tax
liabilities for long enough to adequately collect such tax. Allowing an extended
time between passing a reform and actually collecting tax opens up too many
opportunities for administrative maneuvering, for the development of new
avoidance techniques, for a change in fundamental economic conditions, or for
simply waiting for a change in political power.34
Put another way, it is entirely plausible that a new governing coalition
could be elected at some point in the coming years with sufficient votes to enact
a major tax reform with the goal of fixing how the existing tax system is broken
32. David Gamage, Ari Glogower & Kitty Richards, How To Measure and Value Wealth for a
Federal Wealth Tax Reform 21 (Maurer Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Rsch. Paper No. 444,
2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3817773 [https://perma.cc/Y7SD-JNH7];
Gamage, Five Key Research Findings, supra note 28, at 14–16. Also, one of us (Gamage), has recently
co-drafted both a proposed wealth tax current-assessment reform bill for the state of California and
mark-to-market current-assessment reform bills for the states of New York and Illinois, all of which
incorporate some innovations (that we will explain more fully in future scholarship) for mitigating
concerns related to valuation and liquidity. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 2088, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2020) (containing our valuation innovations at Sections 50307–50309 and containing our liquidity
innovations at Subsection 50307(c)); DAVID GAMAGE, EMMANUEL SAEZ & DARIEN SHANSKE, THE
CALIFORNIA EXTREME WEALTH TAX: REVENUE, ECONOMIC, AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
(2020), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/CAwealthtax.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8YC-Q8BD]; S. 8277,
2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020); Letter from Darien Shanske, David Gamage & Emmanuel
Saez to Governor Cuomo, Speaker Stewart-Cousins & Speaker Heastie (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/states/f/?id=00000176-4ed9-d3e7-a3ff-dfd923d80000 [https://perma.cc/PC
B9-BKBG].
33. E.g., Elizabeth Warren, Ultra-Millionaire Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://
elizabethwarren.com/ultra-millionaire-tax/ [https://perma.cc/DGM6-U24S]; Edward D. Kleinbard,
The Right Tax at the Right Time, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 208, 232 (2017) [hereinafter Kleinbard, The Right
Tax]; Gergen, supra note 1, at 1; see also supra note 32 (listing some other current-assessment reform
proposals that were co-drafted by Gamage). Note that Gamage also advised on the design of Senator
Warren’s wealth tax reform proposals.
34. See infra Part III.
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with respect to the ultra-wealthy. But if this reform is a future-assessment reform,
it is implausible to expect that this coalition would remain in power long
enough, while maintaining sufficient commitment to bolstering its tax reform
throughout, to prevent new opportunities from emerging in the future for
taxpayers to negate or reduce their deferred tax liabilities. We argue that the
most likely outcome is an incremental weakening of the reform in the face of
these forces, perhaps culminating in outright repeal after a shift in political
power.35 And this process is made easier because a future-assessment reform
that has yet to collect much revenue is distinctly disadvantaged politically and
budgetarily.36
To clarify this argument, we distinguish here between two benefits of
deferral. Almost universally when the prior literature has referred to the tax
benefit of deferral, that literature has considered only the benefits baked into
existing law.37 These include, for example, taking advantage of the time value of
money by delaying realization or waiting for the § 1014 step-up in basis, which
wipes out all predeath gains when assets are passed to heirs.38 But the literature
has mostly ignored a second benefit of deferral for wealthy taxpayers, which we
refer to as the political-optionality benefit of deferral.39 In short, deferring the
point at which the law imposes tax gives taxpayers time and opportunity to wait
for the law to weaken or change—and even to lobby for such a change.
History shows time and again that ultra-wealthy taxpayers are well aware
of the limits of the U.S. political system and can thus be expected to defer their
tax liabilities while waiting for future opportunities to permanently negate or
reduce their deferred tax liabilities.40 Thus, it is not enough to continue to rely
on realization to trigger taxation in the future while hoping to impose a presentvalue equivalent tax at that time. Unless some as-of-yet unknown mechanism
can be created to stop taxpayers from reducing or negating deferred tax

35. See infra Section III.A.1.
36. See infra Section III.A.3.
37. E.g., Kwak, supra note 23, at 194; Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset Appreciation Be Taxed?:
The Case for a Disposition Standard of Realization, 86 IND. L.J. 77, 82 (2011).
38. See infra Section III.C.3.
39. Important exceptions to this oversight in the literature include David Kamin & Jason S. Oh,
The Effects of Capital Gains Rate Uncertainty on Realization 32–33 (UCLA Sch. of L., Law & Econ. Rsch.
Paper No. 19-06, 2019), and Daniel Hemel, Taxing Wealth in an Uncertain World, 72 NAT’L TAX J. 755,
768–69 (2019) [hereinafter Hemel, Taxing Wealth]. We have been aided in this project by these papers
and our conversations with the authors. As we will elaborate on in Part III, portions of our arguments
in this project generalize and extend similar ideas developed previously by Kamin and Oh. Hemel’s
Taxing Wealth, which was written at the same time as early drafts of this Article, also has some overlaps.
That said, this Article departs from these papers and the prior literature by developing a more
comprehensive theoretical and normative case for how and why political optionality infects tax policy
and motivates the case for current-assessment tax reforms.
40. See infra Section III.C.
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liabilities in the future, no tax reform that permits deferral will succeed at fixing
how the personal tax system is broken.
This Article explains three sets of pressures that tend to undermine futureassessment reforms over time, but that current-assessment reforms are
relatively resistant to. The first set of pressures arises from policy drift and the
need for incremental bolstering of major tax reforms.41 As this Article
elaborates, the nature of tax politics creates asymmetric pressures that tend to
push toward undermining tax reforms—especially reforms targeted at the ultrawealthy. Consequently, it is crucial that as many key mechanics of a major tax
reform as possible be implemented at or immediately following the time of the
reform’s enactment, while the initial reform coalition still retains its strength
and commitment to the reform. Because future-assessment reforms put off the
actual assessment and collection of tax, such reforms also put off the time when
key administrative decisions and technical corrections are made. This makes it
dramatically more likely that the reform will be substantially undermined over
time.
The second set of pressures arises from the time value of options.42 Futureassessment reforms give taxpayers the choice of when to realize their tax
liabilities—when to exercise the option value of deciding in which future
political regime a deferred tax liability will be realized, assessed, and paid. This
creates strong incentives for ultra-wealthy taxpayers both to wait for future legal
or political changes (favorable to them) and to lobby and exert other political
pressures in the hopes of creating such future changes.
The third set of pressures arises from federal budget rules and resulting
political incentives.43 For federal budget scoring purposes, much of the tax
revenue that might theoretically be raised by a future-assessment tax reform
will show up outside of the budget window. This makes it much more politically
difficult to legislatively bolster and strengthen such reforms while making it
much easier politically to legislatively weaken such reforms.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I further clarifies how the existing
U.S. income tax system is broken. Part II argues that this brokenness creates
serious unfairness and inefficiencies that weaken the entire existing tax system
and that motivate our call for reform. Finally, Part III explains the three sets of
pressures that tend to undermine future-assessment reforms—pressures that
current-assessment reforms are relatively resistant to—developing these
explanations based on theory and an examination of specific future-assessment
reform proposals as well as the history of prior reform attempts.

41. See infra Section III.A.1.
42. See infra Section III.A.2.
43. See infra Section III.A.3.
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I. THE INCOME TAX SYSTEM IS BROKEN
A central motivation of this Article is that taxation of the ultra-wealthy is
both necessary and currently inadequate, and that this failure to tax the ultrawealthy is a systemic problem that undermines the overall income tax system.
The problem is not merely that some rich people get marginally richer. Rather,
the manner in which the tax system benefits the ultra-wealthy reveals core
problems and threatens the integrity of the tax system itself.44
In this part we begin with a description of the ultra-wealthy and the nature
of their income and wealth. The key point is that “[t]hey are different from you
and me”45 in the ways that they earn income and acquire wealth, and therefore
how they interact with the tax system. Based on those differences, we then turn
to how the income tax system is broken. The income tax system does a
reasonably good job of taxing income in the forms of wages and salaries but does
a very poor job of reaching investment income.46 (Readers already familiar with
how investment income is currently only scantily taxed may wish to skip or
skim Part I.)
A.

Who Are the Ultra-Wealthy?

The focus of this Article is on the taxation of a particular subgroup of
American taxpayers that we label as the “ultra-wealthy.”47 By this we mean tax
44. Of course, the failure to tax the ultra-wealthy is not the only way in which the existing U.S.
tax system is broken. For instance, we consider important aspects of the business-level tax system to
also be broken. However, we will argue that the manner in which the existing U.S. personal income
tax is broken with respect to the wealthiest individuals and families makes it harder to mend other ways
in which the existing tax system is broken, so that fixing how the personal tax system is broken with
respect to the ultra-wealthy is a good starting point for reform. See infra Section II.D. For example,
absent a current-assessment reform at the personal level, the business-level tax system must cope with
the problem of personal investors using the corporate form for tax sheltering purposes, and managing
this problem complicates efforts to mitigate other problems plaguing business-level tax reform efforts.
See David Kamin, David Gamage, Ari Glogower, Rebecca Kysar, Darien Shanske, Reuven Avi-Yonah,
Lily Batchelder, J. Clifton Fleming, Daniel Hemel, Mitchell Kane, David Miller, Daniel Shaviro &
Manoj Viswanathan, The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax
Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1445–58 (2019).
45. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE RICH BOY (1926), reprinted in ALL THE SAD YOUNG MEN 5,
5 (James L.W. West III ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
46. See Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 4 (“Wages comprise the vast majority of income
for those outside of the top 1 percent of income . . . . Tax avoidance and evasion are rare for wage
income because it is subject to information reporting and withholding, and because wage earners
generally cannot manipulate the timing of income recognition . . . .”).
47. We describe this Article’s project and narrow its focus in this way because we are abstracting
here from larger questions about the proper tax base(s) for a tax regime as a whole. Our focus here is
on the particular tools and policies needed to meaningfully tax this small group of taxpayers, regardless
of how the remaining tax system is constituted. Indeed, as we will argue, due to the way the wealth and
income of this group is derived, any modern tax system must consider the issues we raise if it wishes
to successfully tax this group. Regardless of whether a country as a whole chooses to tax income, wealth,
consumption, some other measure for economic well-being, or some mixture of these, we believe that
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households in the top 0.1% (more or less) of wealth in the United States.48 This
is, to be clear, a relatively small group—approximately 235,000 individuals49 or
175,000 tax households—though they collectively own as much as $12 trillion in
wealth.50
So, who are they and what does their financial picture look like? We should
say at the outset that comprehensive and reliable data on wealth distribution is
thinner than for income. Much of the information we have is from government
surveys, which have some weakness in tracking some forms of privately held
wealth and attributing them to individuals.51 That said, we can still know to a
reasonably high degree of certainty that certain types of wealth are held by the
class as a whole, even if we cannot assign it to particular individuals.
In a recent paper, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, two of the leading
economists studying income and wealth inequality, use a range of
methodologies to estimate that these 175,000 households in 2019 owned
between 12% and 14% of national wealth, with a minimum wealth of at least $28
million per household.52 Because these levels are estimated using a variety of
methods, including estate tax data, the Survey of Consumer Finances (“SCF”),

successful taxation of the ultra-wealthy requires use of a current-assessment mechanism (as we will
argue in Part III).
48. Over time, the top taxpayers by wealth will roughly correspond to the top taxpayers by
income, but income-based measurements tend to fluctuate more over time as compared to wealth-based
measurements. Thus, the top taxpayers by income in any particular year will correspond less with the
top taxpayers by wealth as compared to considering the top taxpayers by income across a longer time
frame.
49. Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar & Eric Zwick, Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and
Implications for Taxing the Rich 68 tbl.1 (Apr. 24, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors).
50. See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, 2019 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 437, 439, 450 n.19 [hereinafter Saez & Zucman, Progressive Wealth
Taxation].
51. For sources discussing issues of measurement and missing wealth, see generally, for example,
GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS (Teresa
Lavender Fagen trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2015) (2013); Saez & Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation,
supra note 50; Gabriel Zucman, Global Wealth Inequality, 11 ANN. REV. ECON. 109 (2019); Smith et al.,
supra note 49; Annette Alstadsæter, Niels Johannsen & Gabriel Zucman, Who Owns the Wealth in Tax
Havens? Macro Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality, 162 J. PUB. ECON. 89 (2018); Emmanuel
Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income
Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519 (2016); Gabriel Zucman, Taxing Across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth
and Corporate Profits, 28 J. ECON. PERSPS. 121 (2014).
52. Saez & Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, supra note 50, at 460 tbl.2. Although there has
been some debate about other estimates made by Saez and Zucman, most notably their revenue
estimates for wealth tax proposals and their estimates for the overall distributional incidence of the
entire tax system, see infra notes 72 & 113–14, their estimates that we report above seem to be in a
similar range to corresponding estimates made by other notable economists. For instance, Smith et al.
report that there are approximately 238,700 individuals in the top 0.1%, and that these individuals
control approximately 14.3% of national wealth, with a minimum wealth of approximately $14 million
per individual. Smith et al., supra note 49, at 68 tbl.1.
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and the Forbes 400 list,53 we cannot say precisely what the income composition
of this group is. But we can instead look at the 0.1% of households in terms of
income, which is likely to have substantial overlap with the top 0.1% of wealthholders.54 For this group, the largest single income component is capital gains,
and the combination of capital gains, business income, and other forms of
investment income (like interest and dividends) make up roughly 70–75% of
their total income.55
The balance of wage income and investment income in the earnings of the
ultra-wealthy has varied over time. In the last period of dramatic wealth and
income inequality, the 1920s, salaries made up an even smaller share of the
income of the ultra-wealthy than today.56 In the immediate post-World War II
period, investment and business income were relatively low, and so salary
income made up a larger relative share of income.57 When inequality started to
grow again in the late 1970s and 1980s, salary income was a big driver, leading
some researchers to speculate that “superstars”—those who could demand huge
payments for their skills, such as athletes, actors, and CEOs—were driving the
increase in inequality.58 In recent decades, however, financial investment
income, especially capital gains, has returned with a vengeance. Today we can
comfortably say that the vast majority of the income of this ultra-wealthy group
is earned from their financial capital rather than their human capital.59
If we narrow further to examine the top 0.01% of wealth-holders, these
17,500 households own wealth of at least $190 million per household, with an
average wealth of around $365 million.60 Saez and Zucman estimate using SCF
data that the reported income of this group averages $11.6 million annually, but

53. Saez & Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, supra note 50, at 460–61 tbl.2.
54. Many of the people with the highest amounts of wealth will correspondingly also have some
of the highest amounts of income.
55. See, e.g., Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National Accounts:
Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. ECON. 553, 595–97 (2018); Emmanuel Saez, Income
and Wealth Inequality: Evidence and Policy Implications, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 7, 10–11 (2017);
Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 3, 8 fig.3, 53–54 (2011); Philip Stallworth, “Let Me Tell You About the Rich. They
Are Different from You and Me.,” TAX POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
taxvox/let-me-tell-you-about-very-rich-they-are-different-you-and-me [https://perma.cc/Q6WX-B2R
K].
56. See Atkinson et al., supra note 55, at 8 fig.3.
57. See id. at 8 fig.3, 43–45.
58. See, e.g., Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845, 845–46 (1981).
59. To be clear, portions of measured capital gains and returns to wealth holdings may result at
least in part from these taxpayers’ labor efforts (think, for instance, of a superstar investor like Warren
Buffett skillfully selecting stocks). Nevertheless, the key point for our purposes is that most of the
economic income of the ultra-wealthy is earned in forms that our existing tax system deals with very
poorly, rather than in the form of salaries and wages which our existing tax system deals with quite
successfully.
60. See Saez & Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, supra note 50, at 450 n.19, 465 tbl.3, 465–66.
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they say that is underreported by about 50% given typical returns on wealth.61
We can safely assume that all or nearly all of the underreported income is from
investment, given typical avoidance and evasion strategies. Moreover, given
these wealth levels, we can reasonably assume that the income generated by that
wealth swamps whatever these taxpayers might be earning from salary or
wages.62
Ultimately, then, the story of the ultra-wealthy is a story of (a) enormous
holdings of wealth and (b) the dominance of income from that wealth—that is,
investment income—over income from salaries and wages. These first-order
facts make the ultra-wealthy different from the vast majority of taxpayers, who
generally have low or even negative wealth and who earn virtually all of their
income from salaries and wages.63
This difference supports our focusing this Article on the ultra-wealthy.
Again, the existing income tax does a reasonable job at taxing income from
salaries and wages (covering most of the income earned by most taxpayers
outside of the ultra-wealthy). By contrast, the existing income tax is broken
when it comes to taxing the investment income that composes most of the
economic income earned by the ultra-wealthy.
B.

How the Income Tax System Is Broken

The income tax system is broken because it relies on realization—that is,
that most income from the appreciation of assets is only taxed when it is realized
through a sale or exchange of those assets. For most taxpayers, realization is of
little import since they have few appreciated assets, and what they have is
already shielded from taxation anyway.64 But for the ultra-wealthy, whose
income comes via the accumulation of financial assets, realization is central.
Because of the realization-based nature of the income tax, the ultrawealthy—though not only them—can take advantage of tax planning strategies
that defer and then reduce, or even wipe out, the personal-level tax on
investment income. Some strategies for accomplishing this are sophisticated
and aggressive, especially the use of offshore funds.65 But even relatively simple

61. Id. at 465 tbl.3.
62. Even a relatively modest 3% return on wealth of $365 million would generate $10,950,000 of
income in a year. Only in extreme cases does labor income approach that level.
63. See Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 4.
64. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(a) (exempting, inter alia, qualified pension plans from taxation); id.
§ 121 (excluding from gross income up to $500,000 of gain from the sale of a principal residence).
65. For a relatively easy-to-understand explanation of how this works, see Matt Levine, Taxes,
Hedge Funds and an Incident, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 30, 2015, 8:43 AM), http://www.
bloombergview.com/articles/2015-12-30/taxes-hedge-funds-and-an-incident [https://perma.cc/QD3B6HM3 (dark archive)] (“That’s the basic idea of the ‘income defense industry,’ just finding places to
point money-generating machines that won’t generate present taxation. That’s how the Bermuda-
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strategies can be very effective. We describe these below to illustrate that the
income tax system’s failure to tax the ultra-wealthy is based not (only) on
obscure financial engineering, but rather on basic, core features of the income
tax system that have been with us for over 100 years.
1. Strategy 1: Defer Realization of Gains
The simplest strategy of all is to simply not sell any appreciated assets—
and to thereby not realize any taxable investment income from those assets—at
least for a time.66 The income tax applies only to realized gains,67 and so
avoiding realization means avoiding tax on that investment income. To be clear,
the appreciation in an asset is economic income regardless of whether the asset
is sold or not.68 But because the income tax only recognizes the income upon a
sale, reported investment income (and resultant taxes collected) dramatically
understates the amount of true economic income taxpayers derive from
investment.69 Even though market investment returns are generally in the range
of 7–8% (and likely higher for the ultra-wealthy),70 reported taxable returns of
the ultra-wealthy are around 1–2%.71 We can thus estimate that most ultra-

reinsurance thing works; it transforms a money-generating machine (a hedge fund) from immediate
income into capital appreciation.”).
66. Investment income can also come from dividends, interest, and similar payments that do not
benefit from the realization rule. However, dividends in particular are increasingly out of favor. Many
corporations have replaced dividends with stock buybacks, as stock buybacks allow a corporation to
effectively distribute corporate-level earnings to shareholders while triggering less shareholder-level
tax. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Gregg D. Polsky, There’s a Problem with Buybacks, but It’s Not What
Senators Think, 162 TAX NOTES 765, 766–67 (2019). There are also nontax corporate finance reasons
to favor buybacks. See Alex Edmans, The Case for Stock Buybacks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/09/the-case-for-stock-buybacks [https://perma.cc/AB6E-BHJ5 (staff-uploaded,
dark archive)].
67. Gross income includes “[g]ains derived from dealings in property.” I.R.C. § 61(a)(3). “Gains”
are the excess of the amount “realized from the sale or disposition of the property” over the adjusted
basis of the property. Id. § 1001(a)–(b) (emphasis added).
68. See, e.g., HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF
INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).
69. As is typical in the academic tax literature, we use the terms “true” income, “real” income,
and “economic” income—all interchangeably—to refer to Haig-Simons income (which includes
unrealized appreciation). For elaboration on Haig-Simons income, see McCaffery, Taxing Wealth
Seriously, supra note 15, at 314–16.
70. See C. Eugene Steuerle, Taxes, Government Transfers and Wealth Inequality, MILKEN INST.
REV. (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/taxes-government-transfers-and-wealthinequality [https://perma.cc/S2A3-53KF] (“The tendency to accrue capital gains but not expose them
to taxation is especially relevant for those who accumulate great wealth. On average, they (or some
ancestor) became rich by performing two somewhat uncommon acts. First, they saved (or invested
through borrowed dollars) a much larger than average share of their income. Second, they achieved
returns on their net investments that were well in excess of the average real rate of return of 6 or 7
percent enjoyed by the typical stock investor.”).
71. Jenny Bourne, Eugene Steuerle, Brian Raub, Joseph Newcomb & Ellen Steele, More than They
Realize: The Income of the Wealthy, 71 NAT’L TAX J. 335, 336 (2018) (“Taxable returns to capital in our
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wealthy taxpayers only ever realize less than a quarter of their true investment
income as taxable income.72
Moreover, it is well-understood by tax scholars, analysts, and others—
including the ultra-wealthy themselves—that even just deferring the realization
of investment income lowers the effective tax rate on that income. This is
because deferring tax on investment income allows the taxpayer to keep and
continue to earn returns on what would otherwise have been the taxes paid.73
Thus, even to the extent that a taxpayer eventually does pay tax, she still keeps
the after-tax profits from that interim investment—the taxpayer literally can
generate additional after-tax income just by deferring tax payments.74

sample were even lower; in the aggregate, taxable returns were less than 3 percent and the predominant
rate was in the 1 to 2 percent range.”).
72. See id. at 352 (“Consider individuals who received a 7 percent real return (and even higher
nominal return) on their capital in the long term. Assume that for tax purposes they are among the
majority shown here who reported taxable income of only 2 percent or less.”). For a discussion of the
anecdotal and more inferential evidence supporting this estimate, see McCaffery, Taxing Wealth
Seriously, supra note 15, at 329–31. Using more conservative assumptions, Saez and Zucman estimate
that “top wealth holders have a fiscal income that is about or slightly less than half of their true
economic income (defined as wealth times the average macroeconomic return to wealth).” Saez &
Zucman, supra note 50, at 466. This estimate is larger than the two-sevenths estimate from Bourne et
al., supra note 71, at 336, both because Saez and Zucman use more conservative estimates for the share
of wealth reported as taxable income and because they then multiply this by “the average
macroeconomic return to wealth” (which is lower than the 7 percent real return estimate used by
Bourne et al.). Saez & Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, supra note 50, at 466. Because Saez and
Zucman purposefully err on the side of caution in the sense of biasing their estimates to the low end
of the plausible range, we think the Bourne et al. estimates are probably more accurate, but this
difference is not especially important for this Article’s purposes. See Steuerle, Individuals Pay Very Little,
supra note 15 (“[The Bourne et al. estimates] are similar to what I found in a study covering the more
inflationary 1970s. In yet another study, I found that a select group of owners of businesses and farms
subject to estate tax reported even lower taxable returns. And in a book published in the early 1980s, I
showed how net income from capital reported on all individual tax returns was less than one-third of
total capital income in the economy. Keep in mind, regardless of what they report on tax returns, top
wealth holders often achieve very high actual returns on their assets. The merely wealthy commonly
earn stock market returns of 7 to 10 percent per year, while truly rich investors often attained that
status by earning even more. Warren Buffett revealed in one income tax return that he recognized only
about 1/50th of 1 percent of his wealth as taxable income even though his primary asset, BerkshireHathaway stock, had been earning about 10 percent annually.”).
73. To see this simply, suppose a person has some income in Year 1 that would generate a tax T
if paid in Year 1. If instead, the person could defer paying T until Year 2, that would be the present
value equivalent of T / (1 + r) in Year 1, where r is the standard discount rate (a risk-free rate of return).
The intuition is that the person could invest T / (1 + r) in Year 1 to generate T in Year 2 and then pay
the tax owed. If the person could defer paying the tax for n years, the present value of the tax becomes
T / (1 + r)n, and thus approaches zero as n gets larger. For example, if the Year 1 tax would have been
$100, but can be deferred for 20 years, and the discount rate is 5%, the present value of the tax becomes
just $38—a person only needs to set aside $38 in Year 1 rather than $100.
74. Continuing the example in the prior footnote, another way to see the intuition is that the $100
of deferred tax could grow to $265 in 20 years if invested at a 5% return. In 20 years, the person would
still have to pay the original $100 tax, plus a share of the $165 in growth—but they would still be left
with $165(1 - t) after taxes.
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2. Strategy 2: Never Realize Gains
Deferring gains generates a tidy return for owners of wealth even if
eventually a gain is realized and taxes are fully paid. But we can go further,
following not selling with never selling—that is, passing appreciated assets to heirs
at death. At that point, § 1014 of the tax code allows a “step-up” in basis to the
assets’ fair market values.75 This wipes out any unrealized, built-in gain in the
assets when they pass to the taxpayer’s heirs. For the ultra-wealthy, who often
do not consume more than a small fraction of their wealth during their lifetimes,
this is especially important—the tax law essentially subsidizes the accumulation
of large, dynastic wealth. In theory, the estate tax was intended to mitigate this,
by taxing the transfer of wealth at death.76 But sophisticated estate planning
techniques and political erosion of the tax itself means that the estate tax today
is just something else to be planned around, with minimal impact on wealth
accumulation.77
3. Strategy 3: Consume from Untaxed Gains
But what about the share of wealth that a taxpayer does consume during
her lifetime, and thus cannot be passed to heirs? Again, there are relatively
simple strategies to reduce or negate the effective tax on any investment income
that is used to fund consumption. To begin with, the taxpayer could engage in
“tax-loss harvesting,” which simply means offsetting any realized gains with
realized losses, so as to reduce or negate the net capital gains tax.78 For a wealthy
taxpayer with a diverse portfolio, there will likely always be at least some losses
to selectively realize, even when the portfolio as a whole is well in the black.79
Due to advances in financial technology and the rise of “robo-advisers,” these
strategies are now widely available and used even by retail investors.80
Going further, the taxpayer can engage in what Edward McCaffery has
called the “buy, borrow, die” strategy.81 If an ultra-wealthy taxpayer needs more
money to fund consumption than can be generated through tax-loss harvesting,
75. I.R.C. § 1014.
76. For further discussion of the connection between the estate tax and the stepped-up basis
provision, see infra Section III.C.3.
77. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra note 15, at 326 (“[T]he gift and estate or unified
wealth transfer tax system is not taxing wealth seriously. The estate tax has long been essentially a
‘voluntary tax,’ as it was dubbed in 1977. It is easily avoided with fairly standard planning techniques.”).
78. See, e.g., Eric D. Chason, Taxing Losers, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 541, 545 (2016).
79. Plus, sophisticated taxpayers often go further to engage in tax-loss “farming,” which involves
planning investments in advance so as to increase the likelihood that there will later be sufficient losses
for tax-loss harvesting without significantly reducing the expected return on the entire investment
portfolio. See, e.g., How To Invest Tax-Efficiently, FIDELITY (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.fidelity.com/
viewpoints/investing-ideas/tax-strategy [https://perma.cc/2FDR-UYRS].
80. See, e.g., Shomesh E. Chaudhuri, Terence C. Burnham & Andrew W. Lo, An Empirical
Evaluation of Tax-Loss-Harvesting Alpha, 76 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 99, 99–100 (2020).
81. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra note 15, at 306.
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she can simply borrow that money, pledging the appreciated assets that she
earlier bought (or created). This borrowing typically comes at some cost, but at
current interest rates (especially from a bank that is probably very happy to
have other business from the ultra-wealthy and their businesses), that cost can
be very low, especially relative to the tax cost of realization. Moreover, the debt
can then later be paid back after death by selling assets that can be sold at that
time—thanks to § 1014—without generating any taxable income.82 The overall
result is a complete negation of all income tax on investment income, even if
that income is transformed into cash to fund consumption.
4. Other Strategies
Section 1014 and its step-up in basis at death are not the only way to wipe
out tax on investment income entirely. Another major tool is the ability to take
a tax deduction for the full appreciated value of assets donated to charity—
including to the taxpayer’s private foundation—without having to realize any
capital gain on those assets.83 Of course, in this case the wealth also leaves the
person’s hands as a legal matter. But if the cash is held by a private foundation
the donor can still spend that wealth on the matters and issues they care about84
without ever paying any income tax on that wealth as it accumulated. Moreover,
by combining this strategy with valuation-based gaming, many ultra-wealthy
taxpayers succeed in cancelling out tax on much larger amounts of income than
just the assets donated to charity.85
The strategies go on and can become much more sophisticated, and often
more aggressive, sometimes crossing the line to become outright tax evasion,
for example through marketed tax shelters and the like.86 Essentially, all of these
strategies rely on deferral in one way or another—devising techniques for the
ultra-wealthy to defer realizing net capital gains, and ideally to defer any
realization enough into the future that any gain can ultimately be wiped out
through mechanisms such as § 1014.
82. See supra Section I.B.2.
83. I.R.C. § 170(a), (e).
84. For example, for gifts to colleges the donor previously attended; gifts to colleges their children
currently attend; recreational, conservational, or artistic activities they enjoy; or for political, social, or
religious causes they support.
85. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Reforming the Charitable Contribution Substantiation Rules, 14 FLA. TAX
REV. 275, 281–84 (2013).
86. See, e.g., David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption, Capital Income,
and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355, 365 (2014) [hereinafter Gamage, The Case for Taxing] (“There are
numerous variations on these sorts of distortionary responses, and they can often be very complicated—
especially when the responses take advantage of partnership tax rules or the rules governing the taxation
of financial products.”); Del Wright Jr., Financial Alchemy: How Tax Shelter Promoters Use Financial
Products To Bedevil the IRS (and How the IRS Helps Them), 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 611–13 (2013)
(discussing the recent history of tax shelters, other very aggressive tax planning strategies employed by
the ultra-wealthy, and the difficulties the IRS has faced in policing such shelters and strategies).
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To be clear, strategies for negating tax on investment income are not
limited to the ultra-wealthy. Indeed, many banks and investment advisors now
market securities-backed investment credit lines to the merely rich as well, to
make the “buy, borrow, die” strategy explained above more accessible.87 But
what separates the ultra-wealthy for our purposes is not just that they have
access to particularly sophisticated investment and tax strategies (though they
do), but rather the overwhelming dominance of investment income as a share
of their total income. This fact makes even these plain-vanilla strategies
especially powerful and dramatically lowers the effective tax rate on the total
income of the ultra-wealthy.88
Ironically, the ability for taxpayers to easily reduce the amount of their
investment income subject to tax is also the primary justification for why we
have lower tax rates on capital gains than on ordinary income. If the tax rate
were higher, taxpayers would be expected to engage in even more tax planning
and realize even fewer gains, such that tax revenue could drop.89 Due to these
preferential rates, average tax rates on reported income of the top 0.01% are
actually lower than they are for the next richest cohort,90 and this is before we
even account for the tax benefit of using deferral to avoid reporting other
income.
Therefore, one advantage of investment income begets a second
advantage, compounding the preferences for the ultra-wealthy. As we will
elaborate on below, this is a key factor in understanding how the personal
income tax system is broken. The tax strategies that the ultra-wealthy use
undermine the integrity and administrability of the entire tax system as it
applies to ordinary taxpayers. And at the end of the day, this all flows back to
realization and the ability to defer taxation of investment income. To

87. See, e.g., Jordan Wathen, Wall Street’s Hottest Loan Product: Borrow Against Your Stocks,
MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 19, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/11/19/wall-streetshottest-loan-product-borrowing-agains.aspx [https://perma.cc/6948-PUC5].
88. See supra note 73.
89. See, e.g., Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 14 (“That is, above a tax rate on capital gains
of roughly 30 percent, the Treasury would begin to lose revenues because taxpayers would respond by
deferring realizing gains for much longer periods of time.”); McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra
note 15, at 331–33.
90. SOI Tax Stats—Individual Income Tax Rates and Tax Shares, IRS, https://www.irs.
gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-rates-and-tax-shares [https://perma.cc/F5DC-THZ
U] (Sept. 15, 2021) (choose “2001–2018” under “Selected Descending Cumulative Percentiles of
Returns Based on Income Size Using the Definition of AGI for Each Year”); see also IRS, THE 400
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS REPORTING THE LARGEST ADJUSTED GROSS INCOMES
EACH YEAR: 1992–2014, at 13 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14intop400.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7TJK-2CGR]; Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 4.
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meaningfully tax the ultra-wealthy, we must thus counteract this “Achilles’
heel” of the tax system—we must end realization.91
II. THE HIGH COSTS OF FAVORING THE ULTRA-WEALTHY
In Part I we explained how a basic feature of the U.S. income tax—its
reliance on realization for the taxation of investment income—facilitates tax
planning strategies that use deferral to lower, and often erase, the amount of
that tax. In Part III, we will explain why sustainably ending deferral requires a
current-assessment reform, that is, one that imposes tax now, rather than a future
equivalent. But first, we explain here in more detail why the problems of
deferral and favoring the ultra-wealthy are not just matters of simple fairness,
but rather implicate the integrity of the entire tax system. In other words, even
if we agree that the income tax system is broken, how broken is it?
Here we discuss ways in which the realization doctrine and deferral create
harmful consequences for the tax system as a whole. In explaining these
consequences, we also lay the groundwork for why a current-assessment reform
is required. In particular, we discuss below how the realization doctrine leads to
substantially lower tax revenue, unfairness and injustice in the relative
treatment of different groups of taxpayers, economic inefficiency and waste,
and tax system complexity and unadministrability. In broad strokes, these are
the core failings of the entire tax system, and they can each be connected back
to the realization doctrine and the resulting favoring of the ultra-wealthy.
A.

Lost Tax Revenues

We begin with the simple math. For many years, scholars have been
predicting that the U.S. government would need “substantially higher levels of
tax revenues” even just to fund ongoing government operations.92 These needs
have been exacerbated by the reduced revenue and increased spending brought
on by the recent economic downturn initiated by the coronavirus pandemic.93
A number of reforms have been proposed to raise revenue—including especially
91. William D. Andrews, The Achilles’ Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in NEW DIRECTIONS
278, 280–81 (Charles E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield
eds., 1983).
92. Edward D. Kleinbard, Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 593, 599
(2017); see also Ari Glogower & David Kamin, The Progressivity Ratchet, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1499, 1571
(2020); David Gamage, Comments on Daniel Shaviro’s Tax Reform Implications of the Risk of a U.S.
Budget Catastrophe, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 599, 599 (2012) (“Shaviro predicts that . . . the U.S.
is on ‘an unsustainable long-term fiscal path’ . . . . I generally agree with these predictions.” (quoting
Daniel Shaviro, Tax Reform Implications of the Risk of a U.S. Budget Catastrophe, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 577, 577 (2012))); David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility
Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 770 (2010) (“The long-term outlook is even bleaker . . . .”).
93. See, e.g., Andrew Van Dam, The U.S. Has Thrown More than $6 Trillion at the Coronavirus
Crisis. That Number Could Grow., WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2020/04/15/coronavirus-economy-6-trillion/ [https://perma.cc/Q8U8-7AB4 (dark archive)].
IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980S, at
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a Value Added Tax, which the United States is the only major industrialized
country to lack.94 But large amounts of tax revenue could also come just from
imposing tax on the ultra-wealthy commensurate with their levels of true
income and wealth.
As explained above, most of the income of the ultra-wealthy is derived
from their wealth holdings and, as we have described, the U.S. tax system does
a very poor job of taxing that income. The combination of the ability to defer
reporting income from their wealth holdings plus low statutory rates on the
income that is reported means very low effective tax rates on the ultra-wealthy,
well below what they pay on their income for wages and salaries. If,
alternatively, the ultra-wealthy’s investment income was to be taxed at the same
effective tax rates as their wage and salary income, how much additional tax
revenue would that raise?
As a starting point, Lily Batchelder and David Kamin estimate that a 2%
wealth tax on the top 0.1% of tax households would raise $1.9–3.3 trillion over
ten years, depending on the degree of tax avoidance.95 If expanded to the top
1%, this wealth tax could raise $3.5–6.7 trillion.96 For context, the Congressional
Budget Office (“CBO”) projects that the entire existing personal income tax
will raise approximately $24.4 trillion over that same period, and that the entire
existing corporate income tax will raise approximately $3.6 trillion.97 Thus, a
well-designed wealth tax could potentially increase revenues by more than the
entire existing corporate income tax.
Key, however, is that the tax be well designed. More limited reforms
would fall short. For instance, Batchelder and Kamin estimate that a combined
package of eliminating stepped-up basis, taxing accrued capital gains at death,
and hiking the capital gains and qualified dividends tax rate to 28% would raise
only $290 billion over ten years. And they estimate that hiking the top ordinary
income tax rate on income over $10 million from 37% to 70% (a near doubling
of the top rate) would raise at most $320 billion over the same period.98
94. A value-added tax is a consumption tax that is collected incrementally on the “value added”
at each stage of production, distribution, and sale of a good or service. It is like a sales tax in being
borne by the ultimate consumer of the good, but differs in that a sales tax is collected in one lump sum
at sale rather than partially at each stage in the supply chain. See OECD, CONSUMPTION TAX TRENDS
2020: VAT/GST AND EXCISE RATES, TRENDS AND POLICY ISSUES § 1.1.1 (2020), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/sites/152def2d-en/1/3/1/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/152def2d-en&_csp_=c74
456d46ecc7b2f6fd3352bb00363ec&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book [https://perma.cc/UX5
U-U2Y7] (noting that 170 countries have a VAT).
95. Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 13 tbl.3.
96. Id.
97. CBO, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2020 TO 2030, at 7 tbl.1-1 (Jan.
2020), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHF6HQBR].
98. Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 10 tbl.2, 13 (noting that the two estimates differ because
the first is by comparison to current law and the second to current policy).
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Batchelder and Kamin also estimate that a partial mark-to-market tax on
publicly-traded securities, combined with a retrospective capital gains tax on
other assets, on the top 0.1% of taxpayers would raise $0.6–1 trillion over ten
years, depending on the degree of tax avoidance (and $1.7–2.8 trillion if
expanded to the top 1%).99 As we will discuss in Part III, we consider these
reform packages to be flawed designs for mark-to-market style tax reforms
because they involve future assessment, in this case the retrospective capital gains
tax component.100 Because “publicly-traded assets represent only about one-fifth
of assets held by the top 1 percent,”101 relatively little tax would be currently
assessed, which partially explains why their revenue estimates are less than
those above for a full current-assessment wealth tax reform. Nevertheless, even
if we view their estimates as just lower bounds on the revenue potential from a
better-designed current-assessment reform, Batchelder and Kamin’s estimates
still imply that the revenue potential from a well-designed current-assessment
reform would be large.
B.

Real and Perceived Unfairness

The current failure to effectively tax the ultra-wealthy also violates basic
fairness norms. First, this violates “vertical equity” principles, since the
effective tax rates paid by the ultra-wealthy are likely less than the effective tax
rates paid by the next richest taxpayers. Second, this violates “horizontal equity”
principles since the tax rates on the types of income earned by the ultra-wealthy,
namely income generated by their wealth, are less than for other types of
income, namely wage and salary income, even if earned by similarly wealthy
individuals. Moreover, because these tax benefits are in part a function of tax
planning, the most aggressive tax planners are rewarded with lower rates, even
if they have the same income as other taxpayers.
1. Vertical Equity
We take it as given that vertical equity demands that income taxes on
individuals and households should be progressive or, at a minimum,
proportional.102 We have already shown that effective tax rates on the true
economic income of the ultra-wealthy (including unreported income) are quite
low, substantially lower than the effective tax rates paid by those who have a
99. Id.
100. See infra Part III.
101. Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 15.
102. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1222
(1989) (“Exactly what constitutes vertical equity is the subject of some dispute, with proportional and
progressive tax systems being the principal competing conceptions.”); Steuerle, Equal (Tax) Justice,
supra note 17, at 268 (noting that a “progressive” tax is one where the share of income paid in taxes
increases as a taxpayer’s income increases; a proportional tax is one where each taxpayer pays the same
proportion of income in taxes regardless of their income).
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larger share of wage and salary income.103 But this is not the end of the analysis,
since to truly judge the progressivity of the tax system, we may wish to also
consider the effects of other taxes, especially corporate and payroll taxes.
Some of the investment income that benefits from the tax strategies
described in Part I may be subject to business-level taxes, especially the
corporate income tax, and that arguably ought to be considered in assessing the
overall level of tax paid by the ultra-wealthy.104 Doing so has the potential to
change the analysis. In a simplistic model, today’s statutory corporate income
tax rate and statutory personal capital gains tax rate together yield a combined
37% rate on shareholder income earned through a corporation, almost equal to
the top statutory rate on ordinary wage and salary income.105 If that were the
end of the analysis, the income of the ultra-wealthy might not appear to be
preferred after all.
But corporations, particularly large multinationals, have become very
skilled at lowering their effective tax rates, sometimes to 0%, despite often
earning large accounting profits.106 Moreover, at least a portion of the burden
of the corporate income tax is borne by other stakeholders in a corporate
enterprise, especially by workers.107
In addition, the effective tax rates on income invested through other types
of entities and on other types of investments are often much lower. For
instance, real estate investments, through the use of accelerated depreciation
103. See supra Section I.B.
104. For instance, if an individual taxpayer invests in the stock of a publicly traded corporation
subject to the corporate income tax, the income earned at the corporate level may be subject to the
corporate-level income tax, thereby reducing the individual taxpayer’s (unrealized) gains.
105. If a corporation earned profits of x, it could distribute 0.79x after taxes. After paying the 20%
tax on dividends, an individual shareholder would have 0.632x, specifically, an effective tax rate of
36.8% on the corporate profits. Alternatively, expanding this calculation to include the impact of SECA
and NIIT taxes yields a top all-in rate on income earned through a corporation of 39.8%, as compared
to a top all-in rate of 40.8% on wage and salary income. See Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 5–
6, for the details behind these calculations.
106. According to the CBO, the effective corporate tax rate in the United States in 2012 was 18.6%,
at a time when the statutory rate for larger corporations was 39%—implying that the average
corporation can cut the statutory rate nearly in half through planning. CBO, INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISONS OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES 17 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/52419-internationaltaxratecomp.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HUM
-LB3F].
107. Estimates vary, but a typical assumption is that about a quarter of the corporate tax is borne
by labor, creditors, customers, and others, through effects such as decreasing labor productivity and
thus lowering wages or using market power to pass taxes through to consumers. For instance, the Joint
Committee on Taxation and the CBO assume in their models that 25% of the corporate tax burden is
on labor. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-14-13, MODELING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES
ON BUSINESS INCOME 4 (2013); CBO, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND
FEDERAL TAXES, 2008 AND 2009, at 17 (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112thcongress-2011-2012/reports/43373-06-11-householdincomeandfedtaxes.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B3C-C
JRG].
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and debt financing, can typically achieve very low or even negative effective tax
rates.108 Also, much pass-through income is now entitled to the new 20%
deduction for qualified business income.109 And, as discussed, by deferring
realization of income at the individual level, taxpayers can compound these
benefits before finally realizing taxable income.
Furthermore, if we are to take account of the corporate income tax, which
most analysts consider to be at least somewhat progressive,110 then arguably we
should also include payroll taxes and state and local taxes, which most analysts
think are more regressive.111 Recent research by Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel
Zucman examines a broad set of tax burdens and concludes that the all-in
effective tax rate on the richest 400 households may actually be lower than the
tax rate paid by households in the bottom half of the income distribution,112
even without fully accounting for unrealized capital gains.113 Their finding is
disputed,114 but even if the overall tax system turns out to be somewhat
progressive with respect to reported income, we still need to assess the dramatic
benefits from unrealized gains. This is especially true when considering the sort
of dynastic wealth that can take advantage of the step-up in basis and “buy,
borrow, die” strategy. In all likelihood, that pushes the tax system back into
regressive territory.
2. Horizontal Equity
The vertical equity analysis above is not free from doubt, however. It is
difficult to conclusively determine whether the tax system as a whole is
progressive, proportional, or regressive—especially with respect to the ultra108. See Calvin H. Johnson, The Private Advantage of Money-Losing Investments Under Cut-Rate
Capital Gains, 55 TAX NOTES 1125, 1129 (1992).
109. See I.R.C. § 199A.
110. See BENJAMIN H. HARRIS, TAX POL’Y CTR., CORPORATE TAX INCIDENCE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRESSIVITY 1 (2009), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/
alfresco/publication-pdfs/1001349-Corporate-Tax-Incidence-and-Its-Implications-for-Progressivity.
PDF [https://perma.cc/3STN-8K8M].
111. There are real questions about whether and to what extent any of these other forms of taxation
should be accounted for—including for the corporate income tax, which arguably mostly just reaches
excess returns at the corporate level. However, a thorough discussion of these questions is beyond the
scope of this Article.
112. EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE: HOW THE RICH
DODGE TAXES AND HOW TO MAKE THEM PAY, at xi (2019); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman,
Opinion, How To Tax Our Way Back to Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2M7DK6C
[https://perma.cc/R7YC-DWUQ (dark archive)].
113. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Risking the Wrath of 900 Billionaires, 165 TAX NOTES
FED. 398, 401–02 (2019) (explaining why Saez and Zucman’s estimates do not fully account for
unrealized gains).
114. See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, Are US Billionaires Really Paying a Lower Tax Rate than Working
People? Probably Not., FORBES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/
2019/10/11/are-us-billionaires-really-paying-a-lower-tax-rate-than-working-people-probably-not
[https://perma.cc/8UU9-7HAD].
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wealthy. This is because of uncertainty about the distributional incidence of
business-level taxes,115 because there is no clear dividing line between what
should be considered part of the tax system as opposed to a part of other
governmental programs,116 because of the difficulty of estimating the long-term
magnitude of unrealized capital gains with any precision,117 and because of other
murky methodological issues.118 Regardless, even if we assume, for the sake of
argument, that the tax system as a whole might be progressive with respect to
the ultra-wealthy because of the corporate income tax, this does not imply the
absence of substantial fairness violations. Even in this scenario, the treatment
of investment income would still raise troubling issues of horizontal equity,
specifically, the requirement that like taxpayers be treated alike.119
Effective tax rates on different forms of investment income differ wildly,
with corporate equity investments potentially being taxed at relatively high
effective rates (at least absent tax gaming) but with many other forms of
investment income being taxed at much lower or even negative effective rates.120
Batchelder and Kamin show that the present value of the top possible marginal
tax rates vary for a select set of common investment strategies from a high of
40.8% to a low of 0%.121 Similarly, the Tax Foundation, a conservative think
tank, estimated that—prior to the 2017 tax overhaul—the effective tax rates on
investment income varied from as high as 38% (for some corporate equity) to
as low as negative 6% (for some corporate debt), depending on how the
investments were structured.122
In addition to causing the efficiency and economic-distortion harms that
we will elaborate on below, this wide variance in effective tax rates on different
forms of investment income results in a prima facie violation of horizontal
115. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-14-13, MODELING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES
ON BUSINESS INCOME 1 (2013).
116. See, e.g., EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT
SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY (2016) [hereinafter KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS]
(urging scholars and others to consider complete fiscal systems, not tax systems alone); Brooks,
Definitions of Income, supra note 30, at 270–74 (discussing the mutability of the income concept,
especially when considering government benefits).
117. See Sullivan, supra note 113, at 401–02.
118. See, e.g., McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra note 15, at 329–30 (discussing the sparse
data on unrealized capital gains).
119. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 607 (1993).
120. See supra notes 106–13 and accompanying text.
121. Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 5–7.
122. ALAN COLE, TAX FOUND., INTEREST DEDUCTIBILITY - ISSUES AND REFORMS 4 (2017)
(“Debt-financed corporate capital has an effective rate of negative 6 percent, 44 percentage points lower
than the rate on equity-financed corporate capital.”). These estimates were made prior to the 2017 tax
overhaul, which reduced the statutory corporate income tax rate and thereby reduced the effective tax
rate on corporate equity investment, so these estimates should not be taken as current but rather just
as further indication of the wide disparity in the effective tax rates on different forms of investment.
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equity. That is, even if we grant for the sake of argument that the corporate
income tax might make the tax system as a whole progressive with respect to
the ultra-wealthy as a group, the widely different effective tax rates on different
forms of investment income creates wide disparities in the effective tax rates
facing individual members of the ultra-wealthy. This in turn means that a
substantial number of ultra-wealthy taxpayers—those less exposed to the
corporate tax—would almost certainly face very low effective-average tax rates
from all sources combined, even if others pay much more.123 As Batchelder and
Kamin explain, “[i]t also means that, among the wealthy, the most aggressive
tax planners are rewarded, while those who follow the letter and spirit of the
law are penalized. Heirs to large fortunes are taxed especially lightly.”124 No
matter how we slice it, the tax treatment of investment income is riddled with
unfairness and injustice.
3. The Consequences of Perceived and Real Unfairness
The prior two subsections detailed the unfairness of providing tax
preferences for the type of income earned by the ultra-wealthy—namely
investment income—and also the wide disparity in the tax treatment of
different forms of investment income. We believe this case is solid, almost
inarguably so. But some may still push back, perhaps even by questioning the
utility of thinking of “fairness” as a valid norm for policymaking (at least when
considering more than just the setting of tax rates).125 We address below other
critiques more rooted in economic and administrative consequences. But first,
it is important to note that the public’s perception of unfairness may be as or
123. Recently released reports by ProPublica, based on leaked tax return information, further
document that famous billionaires do indeed face very low effective-average tax rates on their true
income. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, Jeff Ernsthausen & Paul Kiel, The Secret IRS Files: Trove of NeverBefore-Seen Records Reveal How the Wealthiest Avoid Income Tax, PROPUBLICA (June 8, 2021),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-secret-irs-files-trove-of-never-before-seen-records-revealhow-the-wealthiest-avoid-income-tax [https://perma.cc/H5QU-WG5C] (reporting that Warren
Buffett paid a “true tax rate” of 0.10%, Jeff Bezos paid 1.1%, Michael Bloomberg paid 1.3%, and Elon
Musk paid 3.27%); Paul Kiel, Jeff Ernsthausen & Jesse Eisinger, You May Be Paying a Higher Tax Rate
than a Billionaire, PROPUBLICA (June 8, 2021), https://www.propublica.org/article/you-may-bepaying-a-higher-tax-rate-than-a-billionaire [https://perma.cc/7KBM-XBVA]. The ProPublica
methodology can be disputed—it does not fully incorporate the effects of the corporate income tax, to
note just one issue. But the leaked tax return information reported on by ProPublica nevertheless
provides further support for concluding that at least a substantial number of ultra-wealthy taxpayers
face very low effective-average tax rates on their “true” economic income.
124. Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 8.
125. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 3–4 (1st paperback
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2006) (“[N]otions of fairness like corrective justice should receive no
independent weight in the assessment of legal rules.”); David Gamage, A Way Forward for Tax Law
and Economics? A Response to Osofsky’s “Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design,” 62 BUFF. L. REV.
189, 191 (2014) (“A number of scholars have suggested that the rules for calculating tax bases should be
designed to promote efficiency, with distributional concerns handled exclusively through the setting of
tax rates.”).
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even more important than a rigorous demonstration of unfairness itself.
Further, the existence of unfairness can have serious negative social and political
repercussions.
If the public believes that the income tax system is biased against ordinary
people and in favor of the ultra-wealthy, this may have very real
consequences.126 And indeed, there is reason to infer that the public’s awareness
of how the income tax fails with respect to the ultra-wealthy may actually be
undermining perceptions of fairness,127 potentially harming both the public’s
faith in the overall tax system and associated tax morale128 and likely also
affecting views of the overall fairness of our economic and political system.129
For example, as Benjamin Friedman, among others, has argued, cultural
breakdown and the rise of populism can often be connected to periods where
masses of people felt that they did not share in a society’s prosperity and when
they feared that their children would be worse off than themselves.130

126. For instance, we think it is reasonable to infer that taxpayers “are more likely to comply
voluntarily and less likely to change their behavior to avoid tax” the more that taxpayers support the
way their tax dollars are spent. Yair Listokin & David M Schizer, I Like To Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support
for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 180 (2013). We similarly
think it is reasonable to infer negative real consequences if taxpayers think that the tax system is unfair
and biased against ordinary people. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action,
and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 80–85 (2003) (arguing that tax compliance behavior derives in part
from reciprocity norms that are in turn influenced by beliefs as to whether others also comply and as
to whether the tax system is fair overall).
127. Joseph Chamie, America’s Taxes—Complex, Incomprehensible, and Unfair, HILL (July 27, 2021,
8:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/564959-americas-taxes-complex-incomprehensibleand-unfair [https://perma.cc/4827-HCVF] (“One national survey found that a majority of Americans,
about 56 percent, including similar shares of Democrats and Republicans, view the tax system as unfair.
An even larger proportion, 60 percent, felt that some corporations and wealthy people don’t pay their
fair share of taxes.”).
128. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1484–99 (2003) (explaining that improving enforcement can increase revenues
from voluntary compliance by bolstering compliance norms, in part because when taxpayers think that
others are getting away with cheating or otherwise not paying their fair share this can undermine
compliance norms); Kahan, supra note 126, at 81 (“These are exactly the factors one would expect to
influence tax compliance were individuals behaving like moral and emotional reciprocators. An
emotional and moral reciprocator wants to understand herself and be understood by others as fair, but
she loathes being taken advantage of. With tax collection as with other collective-action settings, the
extent to which others appear to be contributing to the good in question determines which of these
sensibilities comes into play.”); Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Monica Singhal, Tax Morale, 28 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 149, 157 (2014) (“A number of studies have documented positive correlations between survey
measures of institutional quality, trust in government, and satisfaction with public services and survey
measures of tax morale . . . .”).
129. See, e.g., ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR 78–84
(2007); Clint Wallace, The Democracy Criterion for Taxation 30–33 (Sept. 10, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
130. See BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 7–
9 (2006).
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Moreover, even if one is still skeptical of the moral case for taxing the
ultra-wealthy more, there are secondary consequences of a system that allows
the ultra-wealthy to continue to accumulate wealth rapidly while paying
minimal tax. For example, having extreme concentrations of wealth affects how
and what kind of financial, economic, and investment decisions get made and
also affects politics and political influence.131 There is little doubt at this point
that money has an enormous influence in politics, and when that money is
concentrated in the hands of relatively few people, it can have negative effects
on democracy, even to the degree of threatening our country’s democratic
legitimacy.132
Finally, the income tax is directly implicated in racial injustice. As Palma
Strand and Nicholas Mirkay—among many others133—have explained, the
federal income tax operates “directly to increase wealth inequality, deepening
pre-existing historically-based racial wealth disparities.”134 Specifically, by
heavily taxing wage and salary incomes and only lightly taxing the returns to
owning wealth, the tax system obstructs historically disadvantaged groups from
building wealth and economic power while protecting the comparative
economic power of historically advantaged groups that started accumulating
wealth during more illiberal periods.135
The connections between tax unfairness and racial injustice are deep and
deserving of more in-depth and elaborate discussion than we can offer in this
Article.136 Nevertheless, there should be no doubt that the ways in which the
131. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 129, at 36–38 (discussing the relationship between tax law and
the goal of ensuring “non-domination”); James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 825, 827 (2001) (“Wealth concentration correlates with poor economic growth because of
educational disadvantages for the poor and sociopolitical malaise. Wealth concentration also harms the
democratic process because it gives too much power to the affluent.”).
132. For discussion of the relationship between extreme wealth and efforts to undermine
democracy, see generally NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE
RADICAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA (2016) (discussing the connections between wealth
and the beginnings of libertarian economics, and law and economics especially); JANE MAYER, DARK
MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL
RIGHT (2017) (discussing efforts by the Koch network and others to influence politics). This
relationship is not a new phenomenon. See, e.g., NANCY COHEN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1865–1914 (2002) (discussing, inter alia, Reconstruction and Gilded Era
economic liberals and their connections to corporate power and antidemocratic politics).
133. See, e.g., Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Should the IRS Know Your Race? The Challenge of Colorblind Tax
Data, 73 TAX L. REV. 1, 39–41 (2019) (listing studies finding that tax policies have disparate racial
outcomes); Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 329 (2009)
(“[B]lack homeowners will not benefit as much as white homeowners from the tax provisions that
exclude from income gain on the sale of their homes.”).
134. Palma Joy Strand & Nicholas A. Mirkay, Racialized Tax Inequity: Wealth, Racism, and the U.S.
System of Taxation, 15 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 265, 266 (2020).
135. See id. at 279.
136. For some other relevant prior work on this topic, see generally Dorothy A. Brown, THE
WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES BLACK AMERICANS—AND
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income tax aggravates racial wealth injustices represent further concrete
harmful consequences of the unfairness engendered by the broken nature of the
existing income tax system.
C.

Economic Inefficiency and Waste

Above, we noted the wide disparities in the effective tax rates facing
different types of income and investment strategies, and we argued that this
results in both revenue loss and prima facie fairness violations. We will now
explain how this also causes inefficiencies and economic waste. In particular, we
address the welfare costs associated with the choice to raise a relatively greater
share of revenue from wage and salary income versus investment income. We
also discuss the related welfare costs of allowing taxpayers to use tax-gaming
strategies to opt into lower effective tax rates. (These two points are related to
the issues raised in the prior two sections on lost tax revenue and unfairness,
respectively, but are nonetheless distinct analytically.)
First, note that if an additional dollar of tax revenue is needed, it is most
efficient—from a welfare-economics perspective—to raise it from the source
with the lowest marginal utility of wealth.137 That is, if the government wants
$1,000 more in tax revenue, it will have lower social cost to raise it from Bill
Gates rather than from Bill Gates’s gardener. Taxing Gates an additional $1,000
will have almost zero utility cost to Gates but could meaningfully affect the
utility, or well-being, of the gardener.138
Extending this point, the policy choice to lightly tax investment income
implies a choice to more heavily tax labor income from wages and salaries, at
least if we hold the size of government and level of tax revenue constant. As we
have already explained, investment income is highly concentrated in the ultrawealthy. As a result, taxing wage and salary income more than investment
income means, on average, taxing those with higher marginal utility of wealth
rather than those with lower marginal utility, thus generating unnecessary
economic inefficiency and loss of social welfare.139
HOW WE CAN FIX IT (2021) (explaining racial biases in the income tax system); Andrew T. Hayashi,
Dynamic Property Taxes and Racial Gentrification, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517 (2021) (explaining
racial biases in property tax systems); Bearer-Friend, supra note 133 (discussing racial biases and related
issues in taxation).
137. See Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV.
904, 905 (2011).
138. See Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to
Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSPS. 165, 168–69 (2011).
139. One can argue with the assumption of zero marginal utility of wealth for the ultra-wealthy,
in part because it may contradict the observed degree of effort many ultra-wealthy put into increasing
their wealth even more. A full accounting of the psychology of the ultra-wealthy is beyond the scope
of this Article, but we can note a few things. First, there are a number of other utility benefits that flow
from work, especially in prestigious positions or professions. See Dan Ariely, Emir Kamenica & Dražen
Prelec, Man’s Search for Meaning: The Case of Legos, 67 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 671, 676 (2008).
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Second, recall the range of effective tax rates on different types of income.
The current top all-in effective federal tax rate is 40.8% for wage and salary
income reported on a W-2 and 39.8% for income that is first fully subject to the
corporate income tax and is then also fully taxed at the personal level at the top
capital gains rate (plus the net investment income (“NIIT”) surtax rate).140 The
current top all-in effective federal tax rate is 23.8% for pass-through or other
noncorporate investment income that is characterized as long-term capital
gains,141 and 20% if this income takes advantage of loopholes to avoid the 3.8%
NIIT and Self-Employment Contributions Act (“SECA”) surtaxes.142
But these effective rates can become 0% if realization is deferred until after
death (taking advantage of a stepped-up basis) or if other strategies are used to
eliminate the deferred tax on unrealized gains (such as if profits are shifted to
tax havens in a manner that avoids the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income
(“GILTI”) tax).143 And commonly used tax-gaming techniques can reduce these
top effective tax rates further, often yielding negative effective tax rates.144
Thus, standard tax-planning strategies can yield tax savings of between twenty
and forty cents on the pretax dollar, and maybe more.
In light of this, what stops wealthy taxpayers from using strategies like
“buy, borrow, die” even more than they currently do, so as to wipe out all
personal-level tax on investment income (rather than stopping after just
eliminating most of this tax)? Why do the ultra-wealthy pay any tax at all?

Second, those who work hard primarily just to increase their wealth may see it as more of a “scorecard”
in the game of life, so that ordinal ranking is more important than cardinal amounts. See generally
ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WEIGHING THE COST OF EXCESS (2010) (arguing that humans
are motivated to earn and consume because of relative social position, even though doing so increases
measures of unhappiness). Third, to the extent some ultra-wealthy go out of their way to avoid taxes,
it could also be that this group is particularly opposed to taxation qua taxation and so an appropriation
of wealth through the tax system might cause excessive utility loss relative to other kinds of wealth
declines. See KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS, supra note 116, at 4. Ultimately, these are
empirical questions that might be interesting to answer but which are not a first-order concern—that
is, a benevolent social planner ought not to care too much about a utility loss from this small group of
ultra-wealthy taxpayers, particularly if the planner’s “welfare weights” transfer to the least well-off, as
most analysts assume. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, Generalized Marginal Welfare
Weights for Optimal Tax Theory, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 24, 41 tbl.2 (2016) (showing a “social welfare
weight” of nearly zero for the highest income group); Diamond & Saez, supra note 138, at 168–69.
140. Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 7 fig.2. Taxing corporate income once at 21% when
earned by the corporation and again at a combined capital gains and NIIT tax rate of 23.8% when
distributed to shareholders implies a combined effective tax rate of 39.8%. See id. at 5–6, 7 fig.2.
141. See supra note 10.
142. See supra note 10; Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 5–6. The NIIT and SECA tax can
generally be avoided by characterizing labor income instead as pass-through business income. See, e.g.,
OFF. TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GAPS BETWEEN THE NET INVESTMENT
INCOME TAX BASE AND THE EMPLOYMENT TAX BASE 1 (Apr. 14, 2016), https://home.treasury.gov/
system/files/131/NIIT-SECA-Coverage.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3LZ-ZJFQ].
143. Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 7 fig.2.
144. See Chason, supra note 78, at 586.
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The catch is that these tax-gaming strategies come at a cost, and these costs
generally increase as the strategies get more complicated and aggressive to cover
more economic income.145 Examples of these costs of tax planning include lower
liquidity,146 the costs of borrowing,147 transaction costs of tax-loss harvesting,148
deviation from taxpayers’ risk-reduction and diversification preferences,149 the
excessive complexity of more sophisticated forms of tax gaming, and the cost to
businesses from using inefficient capital structures in order to generate tax
savings.150
As Steuerle explained in his seminal book on the topic, “insofar as
[investment] income is concerned, the individual income tax is primarily a
discretionary tax.”151 As a result, at least with respect to the investment income
of the wealthy, the income tax is effectively just a tax on the choice not to bear
the financial costs of certain avoidance strategies, so that “the discretionary
income tax on [investment] income is a tax on liquidity, risk reduction, and
diversification rather than a tax on income.”152
The key takeaway here is that tax gaming typically involves real economic
costs, and, at the margin, these costs should generally approach the effective
marginal tax rates.153 While incurring these costs may be rational for individual
taxpayers, it is exceedingly wasteful to an economy as a whole.154 In other words,
the productive potential of the overall economy is diminished because scarce
resources are devoted to tax gaming at the expense of productive investment
and business activity.

145. Gamage, The Case for Taxing, supra note 86, at 375–82.
146. Because these strategies often require not realizing gains and instead keeping profits invested
in illiquid assets.
147. Because Larry Ellison-style credit lines charge interest.
148. See C. EUGENE STEUERLE, TAXES, LOANS, AND INFLATION: HOW THE NATION’S
WEALTH BECOMES MISALLOCATED 18–24 (1985) [hereinafter STEUERLE, TAXES, LOANS, AND
INFLATION].
149. Id.
150. Common examples of this include greater use of debt financing for tax purposes, when equity
would be better for business purposes, or designing organizational structures, supply chains, and the
like, through low-tax jurisdictions in a manner that increases business and organizational costs in order
to generate tax savings. See Gergen, supra note 1, at 29–30 (“It is insane to encourage talented people
with useful skills to create complicated financial vehicles that serve no purpose other than avoiding . . .
tax.”).
151. STEUERLE, TAXES, LOANS, AND INFLATION, supra note 148, at 18.
152. Id. at 19. We would add lack of complexity to Steuerle’s list, as we view the excessive
complexity of tax-motivated investment strategies as perhaps the largest form of economic waste
because this complexity interferes with designing investment and business strategies so as to maximize
economic productivity and related pretax returns.
153. Gamage, The Case for Taxing, supra note 86, at 375–82.
154. Id.; Glogower, Taxing Capital Appreciation, supra note 28, at 121–23.
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Complexity and Uncertainty in the Tax System

Perhaps even more troublesome than the other sorts of harmful
consequences explained above, the manner in which the personal income tax is
broken and readily exploited by the ultra-wealthy’s tax gaming undermines the
administrability and integrity of the entire tax system. Fully explaining how
and why this is the case is beyond the scope of this Article. But the key point is
that the realization doctrine—along with the corresponding capital gains
preference and the rules limiting the use of loss deductions—generates the lion’s
share of legal complexity and uncertainty in the income tax system, ultimately
undermining the tax system itself.155
As noted above, because the realization doctrine makes deferring capital
gain trivial, it is generally believed that a preferential rate on capital gain income
is needed to reduce that disincentive to realize gains.156 This then creates a need
to distinguish capital gains and capital losses from ordinary income and ordinary
losses, and that task is a major source of uncertainty and confusion in the tax
law.157 For instance, with respect to the important category of real estate
transactions, a federal judge famously proclaimed it to be a “truism” that “[i]f a
client asks you in any but an extreme case whether, in your opinion, his sale will
result in capital gain, your answer should probably be, ‘I don’t know, and no
one else in town can tell you.’”158
The muddled state of the law on distinguishing ordinary income and
capital gains motivates wasteful tax planning and creates large compliance
burdens and traps for the unwary—including for small businesses and other

155. See, e.g., Glogower, Taxing Capital Appreciation, supra note 28, at 123–24; Ilan Benshalom &
Kendra Stead, Realization and Progressivity, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 43, 47 (2011) (“[M]ost of the income
tax’s shortcomings are a direct result of the realization requirement.”); id. at 51–52 (“[A]ny realizationbased income tax regime needs loss-limitation rules to protect its revenue base against strategic
trading. . . . As difficult as these issues are, the above examples are just the tip of the iceberg in terms
of realization’s costs.”); Funding Our Nation’s Priorities: Reforming the Tax Code’s Advantageous Treatment
of the Wealthy: Hearing Before the H. Ways & Means Subcomm., 117th Cong. 2–9 (2021) (statement of
Chye-Ching Huang, Executive Director of NYU School of Law Tax Law Center) (explaining how “the
menu of tax breaks for income from wealth leads to wasteful tax avoidance, sheltering, and even
evasion”).
156. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
157. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Dmitry Zelik, Are We Trapped by Our Capital Gains? 1–3 (Univ.
Mich. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Theory, Rsch. Paper No. 476, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642860 [https://perma.cc/VW7Q-NY5T].
158. Byram v. United States, 705 F.2d 1418, 1419 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Capital Gains: Dealer
and Investor Problems, 35 TAXES 804, 806 (1957)); see also Tony Nitti, Tax Geek Tuesday: Does the Sale of
Property Generate Ordinary Income or Capital Gain?, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2013, 9:36 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2013/12/31/tax-geek-tuesday-does-the-sale-of-property-generateordinary-income-or-capital-gain/?sh=460c06bc2cdd
[https://perma.cc/69WQ-QGGZ]
(“Some
questions simply can’t be answered. For example: . . . Will the sale of my property give rise to capital
gain or ordinary income?”).
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more ordinary taxpayers (as opposed to just the ultra-wealthy).159 As Reuven
Avi-Yonah and Dmitry Zelik have explained, “a lot of the complexity of the
current tax code results from attempts to block taxpayers from converting
ordinary income to capital gains . . . and from the limitations on offsetting
ordinary losses against capital gains, which has resulted in transactions designed
to create artificial capital losses . . . .”160
Indeed, these harmful consequences are so severe that Avi-Yonah and
Zelik argue that, if it is not possible to adopt a current-assessment reform to
replace realization, we should abandon the goal of increasing progressivity at
the top and instead make the top tax rate 28% for both ordinary income and
capital gains.161 This is because, they argue, 28% is the maximum rate that can
be imposed on capital gains in a realization-based system and because the harms
that result from the capital gains preference are so damaging as to make it not
worth taxing ordinary income at a higher rate.162 In their framing, our only
choices in a realization-based system are to either retain the preferential capital
gains rate or slash the top rates on ordinary income. Despite their preference
for “higher rates on the rich,” they “have reluctantly come to the conclusion that
we are indeed trapped by our capital gains, that the current rate structure is
indefensible in practice, and that we should revert to an overall rate of 28% for
all income.”163
For a related example, consider the difficulties of distinguishing between
when payments from businesses to investors should be considered returns to
investment as opposed to wages or other disguised payments for labor or
services.164 Under current law, the personal capital gains preference and the
various surtaxes like SECA and NIIT mean that the way payments from
businesses to investors are characterized can yield quite different personal-level

159. See Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 157, at 40; Nitti, supra note 158; Len Burman, Mitt Romney’s
Teachable Moment on Capital Gains, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2012, 6:46 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/leonardburman/2012/01/18/mitt-romneys-teachable-moment-on-capital-gains/?sh=224cf1787a4e
[https://perma.cc/4DSU-W2TF] (“[T]axing capital gains at much lower rates than other income
creates a ginormous loophole that leads to a tremendous amount of inefficient tax shelter activity.
Virtually every individual income tax shelter is devoted to converting fully taxed income into capital
gains. . . . With that kind of payoff, there is a whole industry devoted to inventing schemes to generate
current deductions to shelter the wages and ultimately recoup it years later as lightly taxed gains. These
shelter schemes entail inefficiency . . . .”).
160. Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 157, at 17.
161. It should be noted that the top marginal tax rate on ordinary income was the same as the top
capital gains rate from 1988 to 1990, following the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514 §§ 101, 302, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096, 2218 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1).
162. Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 157, at 4.
163. Id.
164. See Richard Winchester, Working for Free: It Ought To Be Against the (Tax) Law, 76 MISS. L.J.
227, 258 (2006) [hereinafter Winchester, Working for Free].
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tax consequences.165 This results in widespread tax gaming and major
inefficiencies and inequities.166
It is not an exaggeration therefore to say that the realization doctrine—
along with the corresponding capital gains preference and the rules limiting the
use of loss deductions—greatly harms the integrity and functioning of the
overall tax system. In addition to opening the door to tax preferences that
benefit the ultra-wealthy, the realization doctrine leads to excessive and
unnecessary legal complexity and uncertainty affecting many more ordinary
taxpayers. In the next part, we explain why current-assessment reform is
required to effectively tax the ultra-wealthy, but it is an additional benefit that
these reforms would also either lessen or eliminate the need for a capital gains
preference (and related anti-abuse rules) by reducing the ability of taxpayers to
time the realization of gains.
III. THE NEED FOR CURRENT-ASSESSMENT TAX REFORM
The previous two parts explained how the realization doctrine and the
availability of deferral have fundamentally broken our income tax system,
particularly with respect to its treatment of the ultra-wealthy, as well as
explained some of the harmful consequences of that failure. The clear solution
is to end—or at least greatly limit—deferral. But how?
With certain notable exceptions,167 the prior literature has mostly
embraced reforms that would seek to lessen or end the financial benefits of
deferral while still fully or partially retaining the realization doctrine—
specifically, these reforms would generally not assess tax until a gain is realized
through a sale or exchange.168 For example, such a reform might postpone the
assessment of tax on illiquid assets, such as shares in privately held firms, but
would impose at that time an interest charge to offset the benefits of deferring
the assessment until those shares are sold.169
We argue here, however, that such future-assessment reforms are
insufficient. To truly repair the personal tax system and meaningfully tax the
ultra-wealthy on their economic income (or on any alternative comprehensive
165. See, e.g., Richard Winchester, Carried Interest for the Common Man, 142 TAX NOTES 1250, 1255
(2014) [hereinafter Winchester, Carried Interest]; Winchester, Working for Free, supra note 164, at 248.
166. Winchester, Carried Interest, supra note 165, at 1257–58.
167. See supra notes 32–33.
168. See Benshalom & Stead, supra note 155, at 47 (describing a “consensus” among scholars that
reforms should continue to tax “at least some assets . . . only upon realization”).
169. For instance, the Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Ron Wyden, proposed a reform of
this sort in 2019. See generally RON WYDEN, SENATE FIN. COMM., TREAT WEALTH LIKE WAGES
(2019), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Treat%20Wealth%20Like%20Wages%20RM
%20Wyden.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QX9-LFZX]. We explain why this sort of partial future-assessment
reform (on its own) is unlikely to succeed at sustainably fixing the personal tax system. See infra Section
III.B.1.
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measure of well-being or ability to pay), a current-assessment reform is needed.
That is, we need a reform that would assess and impose tax on a periodic basis
as economic income accrues (or, alternatively, as wealth or spending power
accumulates), rather than attempting to tax at some future date that may never
actually occur.
Section III.A below elaborates on our theory for the necessity of a currentassessment reform. The key insight is that, although a future-assessment reform
might theoretically cancel out the financial benefits of deferral under existing
law, it is powerless against the effects of future political shifts. As a simple
example of this point, consider that if a future-assessment reform is put in place,
but a later political coalition repeals it before any gains are actually realized, it
will have accomplished nothing.
To clarify the difference between current-assessment and futureassessment reforms, and why current assessment is superior, Section III.B
discusses two leading future-assessment reforms—retrospective capital gains
taxation and progressive consumption taxation.
Section III.C then explores several prior real-world examples of the
difficulties posed by political shifts. This review illustrates the centrality of
political optionality to tax politics. Time and again, taxpayers have managed to
undermine future-assessed taxes, and there is every reason to expect that this
will generally be the fate of future-assessment tax reforms.
A.

Current Assessment: Tax Now or Tax Never

We argue that meaningfully taxing the ultra-wealthy, and thereby
beginning to repair our tax system, requires reform that is sufficiently robust
against the possibility of future erosion, attack, or repeal. In particular, any
reform must not rely on tomorrow’s Congress or executive agencies to ensure
meaningful taxation of today’s income or wealth accumulations. In other words,
what is needed is a current-assessment reform—we must tax now, not later.
To sketch out our approach, consider the following thought experiment.
Suppose that a political coalition enacts a reform with the goal of successfully
taxing the ultra-wealthy. Further suppose that this reform will take effect across
two time periods. In the first period, some economic income is earned, perhaps
by appreciation in the value of an asset. In the second period, a tax is imposed
on that first-period income which is the present-value equivalent of the firstperiod tax had it been imposed. What happens by the time we reach the second
period?
There are essentially three possibilities. First is that the original reform
coalition both remains in power and remains fully committed to bolstering the
reform. As a result, this coalition is able to fend off political attacks against the
reform while passing any necessary follow-up legislation or taking other
necessary follow-up actions to reinforce the reform, as policymakers start to
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observe both the efficacy of the reform itself as well as taxpayer responses to it,
many of which will likely have been unanticipated at the time of the initial
enactment.
A second possibility is that there is a complete shift to an opposing
political coalition, and the new coalition then either fully repeals the reform or
replaces it with a new regime that is more favorable to its supporters.
The third possibility is that we could end up somewhere in the middle,
with the original reform coalition either weakened or less committed to
bolstering its initial reform but with that original coalition retaining enough
power and commitment to block its reform from being completely repealed or
replaced. In this case, full repeal of the original reform is unlikely, but equally
unlikely is the incremental maintenance and adjustment that is required to make
the original reform operate effectively.
Our observation from past reforms, both tax and nontax, is that the
probability of the second and third possibilities together greatly outweighs the
probability of the first.170 Indeed, we believe that the most likely outcome by far
is the third possibility—a gradual erosion of the reform due to neglect because
the original coalition is too weak to bring necessary incremental reforms in the
face of taxpayer innovation, changing economic circumstances, and experience
with the actual effects of the law.
If this is the case, then there is a significant likelihood that any tax actually
imposed in the second period will not in fact be the present-value equivalent of
tax in the first period, even if that was the way the law was written. This
becomes increasingly likely as the length of time increases between the first and
second periods. Of course, this outcome would obviously follow from a full
repeal of the initial reform. But more likely is that the initial reform would just
be eroded somehow—by taxpayers devising strategies in the interim period to
game around the law; by economic conditions changing so that the assumptions
underlying the initial reform no longer hold and in a manner that erodes the
initial reform; by relatively minor changes to the initial law, well short of full
repeal, that nevertheless undermine its intended effects, such as rate changes or
new exemptions; by critical errors in the original law going uncorrected; by
subsequent administrative rulings or court decisions that undermine the reform;
and so forth. While some tax may still be collected in the second period, the
effective tax rates may be so reduced as to make deferral still very rewarding.
Exacerbating all of this, sophisticated taxpayers can often anticipate and
even influence the likelihood of these (favorable to them) outcomes. There is
an option value to waiting, and for the ultra-wealthy, even minor erosions in
the law could generate a huge return to deferral. The clear conclusion therefore
is that reforms that rely on the imposition of tax in the second period are
170. See infra Section III.C.

100 N.C. L. REV. 487 (2022)

2022]

TAX NOW OR TAX NEVER

523

inferior to those that impose tax in the first period—current assessment.
Choosing to tax later risks taxing never.
To fill out and formalize the theory, we need to introduce a few terms and
concepts. We have already distinguished a current-assessment reform from a
future-assessment reform. For purposes of our argument, we assume that either
reform as drafted would impose the same present-value equivalent tax (in
financial terms). The key difference is the timing of that assessment—tax now
or tax later.
In considering the benefits of deferral—of waiting—the prior literature
mostly just considers what we label as the existing-law benefits of deferral—that
is, the benefits that are encoded into existing law. These existing-law benefits
of deferral can be further broken down into time-value benefits (the financial
benefits of deferring tax liabilities due to the time value of money) and loophole
benefits (the ways under current law that taxpayers can reduce or completely
wipe out deferred tax liabilities, such as § 1014’s step-up in basis on death). Most
leading reform proposals aim to eliminate one or both of those benefits.171
But there is another benefit of deferral: the ability to wait for favorable
legal or political change. We label this the political-optionality benefit of deferral.
If there is some chance that a reform could erode or be repealed in the future—
and, with future-assessment reforms, there always is—then there will still be
incentives to defer realization of gain, even if the tax on that gain would be the
present-value equivalent of a current tax, were it to be assessed. In other words,
if there is some nonzero probability of a taxpayer-favorable future legal change,
then this lowers the expected value of that future tax below the present-value
equivalent. Put yet another way, options have real value, as any financial
professional would tell you, and the possibility of future legal change gives the
ultra-wealthy that option for free.172 Both historical experience and political
theory strongly imply that the ultra-wealthy are likely to take advantage of
options to defer their tax liabilities so as to then wait for more favorable political
or legal changes.
To be sure, current-assessment reforms are also at risk of future erosion or
repeal, and there is no guarantee that future political change will be favorable
to the ultra-wealthy. But institutional, political, and economic realities all put a
heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the ultra-wealthy when it comes to futureassessment reforms, thus giving political optionality a positive value. Of course,
171. With respect to loophole benefits, this has mostly consisted of calling for the end of existing
loopholes like § 1014. With respect to time-value benefits, the prior literature has proposed reforms
that would eliminate time-value benefits by taxing deferred liabilities upon realization, such as by
imposing an interest charge to offset the time-value benefits. See supra note 23.
172. Or almost free—other costs, like costs of borrowing or of nondiversification are real, but
relatively minor (inframarginally) relative to the tax benefits. See Steuerle, Individuals Pay Very Little,
supra note 15.
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it is theoretically possible that a current-assessment reform could be reversed in
the future, along with taxpayers then being given refunds for any tax previously
paid. However, as we will explain, this is dramatically less likely to occur as
compared to a future-assessment reform being eroded or terminated prior to
the assessment of tax. We will now proceed to elaborate on three sets of
pressures that all add up to creating large political-optionality benefits with respect
to future-assessment reforms.
1. Policy Drift and the Need for Incremental Bolstering
The standard view of the U.S. federal legislative process is that it features
a heavy status-quo bias—that is, major policy reform of any kind is extremely
difficult.173 The typical explanation for this is that the U.S. system features a
high number of “veto” or “pivot” points.174 Specifically, in order for legislation
to be enacted, the legislation must overcome a number of hurdles. For example,
at various points in the legislative process, the House Speaker, the median
House Member, the Senate Majority Leader, the 60th Senator, the President,
and the 34th Senator and 146th House Member (for overcoming a Presidential
veto) all could have the power to stop a piece of legislation.175 Because these
individuals may occupy very different points on the ideological spectrum,
designing a major reform that can overcome all of the pivots is exceedingly
difficult to accomplish.
Moreover, a reform that can overcome all of these veto points is likely to
be somewhat unstable. As Jason Oh has argued, if a large reform package is a
product of negotiation and compromise, it may contain individual policies that
would not have had sufficient support to pass on their own—that are only
passed because of political horse-trading.176 However, if those policies can be
legislatively decoupled after passage, then one or more of them is at risk of
repeal or change, even if the other parts of the reform stay in place.
173. See, e.g., LANE KENWORTHY, SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AMERICA 169–76 (2014); JACOB S.
HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH
RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 83–87 (2010); NOLAN MCCARTY,
KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY
AND UNEQUAL RICHES 165–66 (2006); SARAH BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 67–75 (2003).
174. See, e.g., David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing
Default Rules for Budgets, 86 COLO. L. REV. 181, 189–91 (2015); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND
INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 72–74 (2012); HACKER
& PIERSON, supra note 173, at 83–87; KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S.
LAWMAKING 20–28 (1998); George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289, 316–19
(1995) (noting policy stability in the United States is related to number of “veto players”).
175. See KREHBIEL, supra note 174, at 22–24; Jason S. Oh, The Pivotal Politics of Temporary
Legislation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1055, 1060–61 (2015).
176. Jason S. Oh, Will Tax Reform Be Stable?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1183–86 (2017).
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This helps to explain why the United States typically experiences policy
drift—that is, why legislated policies tend to evolve somewhat organically over
time, often without clear action by legislators. This sort of policy drift can take
a number of forms, which are worth isolating for clarity.
First, there is the sort of incremental repeal that Oh explains—whereby
legislators might find sufficient support to make small changes that serve to
partially undermine a larger reform package. For a concrete example, consider
the “Cadillac” tax passed as part of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)—an excise
tax on expensive health care plans.177 The Cadillac tax was included for two
reasons. First, the tax was intended to try to offset the tax benefit of the
exclusion for employer-provided health care by clawing back the tax benefit of
the exclusion for the highest earners, and thereby perhaps also helping to lower
health care costs generally. Second, the tax was a revenue-raiser to ensure that
the ACA got a favorable budget score from the CBO. For both of these reasons,
it was meant to be an important part of the original compromise of the ACA.
Yet, the Cadillac tax was repealed before it ever took effect.178 Once the tax
could be peeled off from the full ACA, it became unpopular and unstable, and,
as a result, subject to incremental erosion and then repeal.179 Compared to the
original design of the ACA, that repeal had the effect of shifting the costs of
the ACA away from the relatively well-off taxpayers who tend to have these
sorts of high-value health plans.
Second, a legislated policy might remain static but with the underlying
economic or other conditions then changing in a manner that impacts the
policy’s effectiveness. This second dynamic is especially likely to occur in the
context of distributional policies, tax or otherwise, and to gradually undermine
the distributional impact of such policies.180 As we discuss below, this is a key
aspect of the story of stepped-up basis—a policy that had some logic in 1921
when the estate tax and the income tax mostly reached the same taxpayers, but
177. See, e.g., Paul N. Van de Water, Why Congress Shouldn’t Repeal the Cadillac Tax, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 11, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/why-congressshouldnt-repeal-the-cadillac-tax [https://perma.cc/PG59-6XAZ].
178. Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, div. N, tit. I, § 503, 133
Stat. 2534, 3119 (2019); Katie Keith, ACA Provisions in New Budget Bill, HEALTH AFFS. (Dec. 20,
2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191220.115975/full/ [https://perma.cc/NK986PRP (staff-uploaded, dark archive)] (“The Cadillac tax and medical device tax are repealed beginning
in 2020.”).
179. Indeed, as early as 2012, it was fully predictable—and was indeed so predicted—that Congress
would likely repeal the Cadillac tax before it would ever go into effect. See David Gamage, Perverse
Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed To Prevent
Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 686 (2012) (“The Cadillac
excise tax is not scheduled to go into effect until 2018, however, and there is reason to doubt whether
Congress and the President will allow the provision to go into effect at that time.” (footnotes omitted)).
180. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 173, at 43–44, 52–54; Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk
Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States,
98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243, 246–49 (2004).
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then remained in place even as other policy changes and developments later
destroyed that logic.
Third, policy drift can occur in the form of bureaucratic drift—where the
legislation itself remains static but with regulators and others in federal agencies
acting to affect the resulting policy in other ways.181 For example, the favorable
tax treatment of carried interest is in large part a result of a series of incremental
administrative rulings by the IRS.182 In most cases, regulators’ ability to move
policy is real but limited. Major reform is unlikely to come from only an
executive agency, but smaller changes are possible and are often unlikely to be
checked by Congress. And such smaller changes can have the effect of opening
the door to tax gaming that substantially undermines the original legislative
purposes. This is because stopping this sort of bureaucratic drift may require
Congress to pass new legislation (which, for the reasons discussed above, is
unlikely), individuals to engage in successful litigation (which is risky,
expensive, and delayed), or voters to change the party controlling the
presidency.
Fourth, policy drift can also occur in the form of judicial decisions. For
example, Daniel Hemel and Robert Lord have explained how the Tax Court’s
decision in Grieve v. Commissioner183 has enabled ultra-wealthy taxpayers to “use
family-controlled entities to significantly reduce transfer tax liabilities.”184 Of
course, judicial decisions that erode tax legislation (like Grieve) can usually be
overturned by subsequent acts of Congress. However, this again requires
Congress to pass new legislation—which is unlikely to happen for all the reasons
discussed above.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, policy drift can occur through
legislative and administrative agency inaction—through failure to prevent new
forms of tax gaming, what Sloan Speck calls “[tax] planning drift.”185 As Speck
explains, this form of drift is especially likely to have distributional
consequences favoring the ultra-wealthy because the “beneficiaries of planning
drift have the means, opportunity, and inclination to engage experts to render

181. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 94–98 (1992); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 246–47 (1987).
182. See Fleischer, Taxing Partnership Profits, supra note 13, at 8–15; see also infra note 191 and
accompanying text.
183. 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175 (2020).
184. Daniel J. Hemel & Robert Lord, Closing Gaps in the Estate and Gift Tax Base 8 (Univ. of Chi.
Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 937, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3904454 [https://perma.cc/9VWH-APR4].
185. Sloan G. Speck, Tax Planning and Policy Drift, 69 TAX L. REV. 549, 567–70 (2016) (explaining
how tax planning drift can result from government inaction).
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legal advice,” with the result that “those who do not engage such experts suffer,
in a relative sense.”186
On its own, this story of status-quo bias and policy drift does not
necessarily indicate which way a policy will drift. If drift were random, it might
be just as likely for the original reform to become stronger, rather than weaker.
Alas, history and theory suggest otherwise, particularly in the case of policies—
tax and nontax—that focus on issues related to inequality and distribution.187
Because distributional policies typically have concentrated harms (on the
wealthiest) but diffuse benefits (on the rest of the population), the political
pressures tend to favor the wealthy and thus produce lopsided outcomes.188 We
should therefore expect that both acts and failures to act will generally be more
likely to benefit the already well-off at the expense of the less well-off.
Moreover, policy drift in favor of the wealthiest is especially likely the
more that important aspects of the policies in question are too complicated to
be well understood by the general voting public or communicated to the voting
public via mass media.189 The history of U.S. tax administration is rife with
examples of important but complicated details of the tax system drifting in a
manner that favors the wealthiest. Some of these examples include Congress
legislating such changes,190 but many examples are based on regulators at
Treasury or IRS revising interpretations of the tax code to favor the
wealthiest.191 Even more common are examples resulting from government
186. Id. at 584–85.
187. See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 173, at 52–54; GILENS, supra note 174, at 79–81 (showing
asymmetry of government responsiveness to policy preferences of rich and poor); E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 32 (1960) (“[T]he [political] pressure system has an upper-class bias.”).
188. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971) (theorizing a political economy of concentrated benefits and
diffuse costs, where small groups can successfully lobby for special benefits in the face of majority
opposition when the individualized costs of opposition are too high and the individualized benefits of
opposition are too low).
189. See Hacker, supra note 180, at 252 (discussing “incremental” and “subterranean” policy drift
in favor of the wealthy).
190. The 2017 tax overhaul is a notable example of this. See Kamin et al., supra note 44, at 1443.
Consider also the expansions of Section 179 and Subsection 168(k), as discussed in MICHAEL A.
LIVINGSTON & DAVID GAMAGE, TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING, AND POLICY 342–43 (3d ed. 2019).
Or, for a more technical set of examples that opened the door to substantial tax gaming, consider the
legislative changes since 1996 that have facilitated the rise of tax gaming through “Mega-IRAs” as
discussed in Letter from Daniel Hemel, Professor of L., Univ. of Chicago L. Sch., and Steve Rosenthal,
Senior Fellow, Urb.-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., to Senate Comm. on Fin. 5–8 (Aug. 11, 2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3903624 [https://perma.cc/8AH2-ELCW].
191. See LIVINGSTON & GAMAGE, supra note 190, at 340–41 (explaining how the so-called “repair
regulations” revised tax law to the substantial benefit of well-off taxpayers); Calvin H. Johnson,
Destroying Tax Base: The Proposed INDOPCO Capitalization Regulations, 99 TAX NOTES 1381, 1382–87
(2003) (explaining how the Treasury Department revised the rules governing capitalization of
intangibles to favor wealthy taxpayers); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-6-97, REVIEW OF
SELECTED ENTITY CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP ISSUES 13–17 (1997) (discussing the check-
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inaction—the failure to block new forms of sophisticated tax gaming that
undermine the effectiveness of the rules to the benefit of the wealthiest.192
Because the costs of tax policies aimed at the wealthiest are concentrated
and the benefits diffused, there is a heightened hurdle to achieving any reforms
that would meaningfully tax the wealthiest. But this hurdle can be overcome to
the extent that the reforms in question are sufficiently popular with the overall
voting public. Yet for this popularity to matter, the voting public must
understand the policies in question at least well enough to reward politicians
and other political actors supporting such policies and to penalize politicians
and other political actors opposing them. Consequently, the more complicated
and difficult to understand the policies are, the less likely it is that public
opinion can effectively counteract the concentrated political power wielded by
the wealthiest who would suffer the costs of distributional tax policies.193
The dynamics of tax deferral are inherently complicated and difficult to
convey to the voting public, as are the mechanics and effects of provisions like
§ 1014’s step-up in basis that can serve to negate tax following deferral. By
contrast, the voting public typically finds it much easier to understand tax

the-box regulations, Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, -3, which opened the door to large-scale tax-gaming by
sophisticated taxpayers); Brant J. Hellwig & Gregg D. Polsky, The Employment Tax Challenge to the
Check-the-Box Regulations, 111 TAX NOTES 1039, 1039 n.1 (2006) (same); see also Littriello v. United
States, 484 F.3d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding the check-the-box regulations); Jesse Drucker &
Danny Hakim, How Accounting Giants Craft Favorable Tax Rules from Inside Government, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/19/business/accounting-firms-tax-loopholesgovernment.html [https://perma.cc/6VR2-3EYD (dark archive)] (discussing the regular “revolving
door” practice of lawyers from top accounting firms and major law firms taking positions at the
Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Policy, working on regulatory projects on issues related to the
interest of their former and future clients, and then returning to accounting firms or law firms at senior
levels to advise on the regulations they worked on, and providing numerous examples of how this
resulted in regulations favorable to the wealthy interests that can afford to hire these elite tax lawyers
once they return to private practice); Daniel Shaviro, The Revolving Door at Treasury, START MAKING
SENSE BLOG (Sept. 20, 2021), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2021/09/the-revolving-door-attreasury.html [https://perma.cc/TQ64-N99M (staff-uploaded archive)] (commenting on this
revolving-door practice and saying that the elite tax lawyers involved are “creating at least the
appearance of impropriety, and embracing systemic, even if one chooses not to say personal,
corruption”).
192. See Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power To Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 633 (2017)
(explaining that, and why, the Treasury Department only minimally uses its powers to support revenue
raising and instead generally acts in a revenue-losing manner) [hereinafter Hemel, The President’s
Power]; Brian Galle & Stephen Shay, Admin Law and the Crisis of Tax Administration (July 3, 2020)
(incomplete draft) (on file with authors) (explaining why tax agencies are biased “against revenue and
against the poor”); Speck, supra note 185, at 584–85 (explaining how “[tax] planning drift”
disproportionately benefits the wealthiest).
193. It is worth noting here that wealth tax reforms are especially easier to explain to voters—at
least as compared to reforms to the timing rules of the income tax—and we view this as a major
advantage of wealth tax reforms.
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policies that raise revenue currently, and tax cuts offered with respect to such
policies are typically more salient.194
Overall, this picture of U.S. tax policymaking suggests that major reform
is difficult and rare, and that when it happens, it will be at least partially
undermined over time by policy drift, unless the original political coalition
remains at its full strength and retains its full initial commitment to the
reform—which almost never happens. In the more likely scenario, party and
ideological control will shift over time, opening the door to a gradual erosion of
the original policy. And this is especially likely the more complicated and
difficult it is to convey the essence of the reform to the general voting public.
Consequently, for a major tax reform targeted at the ultra-wealthy to
remain effective over time, it is crucial to implement as many key mechanics of
the reform as possible at the time of enactment, or soon thereafter, while the
original reform coalition still retains its strength and commitment. Yet futureassessment tax reforms do the opposite. This is because putting off the actual
assessment and collection of tax means also putting off the review of the taxgaming techniques that taxpayers will devise in their attempts to escape the tax,
putting off the technical revisions and other administrative responses that will
need to be made to correct the unanticipated difficulties that will inevitably
arise as part of assessing and collecting tax, and, more generally, putting off the
many administrative agency decisions required to effectuate tax assessment and
collection.
Effectuating a major tax reform requires more than just passing the initial
legislation. Many crucial administrative decisions and technical corrections
must be made at the time that taxes are actually assessed and collected. For
current-assessment tax reforms, this typically happens during or immediately
following the reform being enacted, while the initial reform coalition typically
maintains its full strength and commitment and while key administrative
officials and staff are thus typically oriented toward bolstering the reform.
For example, a wealth tax or accrual-income tax reform could begin
collecting revenues immediately. Indeed, such reform proposals are often
194. This is partially an artifact of budget rules, as explained further in Section III.A.3. But this is
also an artifact of the fact that definitions of income and of other tax-base measurements are inherently
murky with respect to time, which makes it impossible to convey unambiguous and uncontroversial
revenue or distributional information with respect to unrealized gains and other future-assessment
components of tax systems. See Sullivan, supra note 113, at 401–02; Brooks, Definitions of Income, supra
note 30, at 268. By contrast, it is relatively easy to measure the tax revenues actually paid (or expected
to be paid) in any given year, which makes it relatively easy to communicate related information about
these measurements to the voting public. For more extended discussions of factors affecting tax
salience, see, for example, David Gamage, On the Future of Tax Salience Scholarship: Operative
Mechanisms and Limiting Factors, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 176–202 (2013); David Gamage & Darien
Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 20–22
(2011).
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designed so as to apply retroactively, with the first year of tax assessment
scheduled to start with the tax year prior to the passage of the reform
legislation.195 By contrast, for future-assessment tax reforms that would
continue to rely on realization, taxes on current gains or wealth accumulations
would typically only be assessed much later (following realization), potentially
many years or even many decades later. By then, the initial reform coalition
would likely have lost at least some of its strength and commitment to the
reform. Additionally, key administrative officials and staff would likely have
moved on from their initial focus on bolstering the reform to instead being
motivated more by the asymmetric pressures that generally tend to undermine
distributive policies over time.
These dynamics make it dramatically more likely that a future-assessment
reform will be eroded or undermined prior to the assessment of tax, especially
as compared to the likelihood of a current-assessment reform being fully
repealed along with taxpayers then being given refunds for tax previously paid
through a current-assessment reform. Completely overturning a currentassessment reform and then refunding taxes previously paid typically requires
explicit legislative action that must overcome all relevant veto points. And
legislating refunds of taxes previously paid by ultra-wealthy taxpayers is likely
to be very politically salient. By contrast, as we have explained, futureassessment reforms can be undermined through inaction or through relatively
minor and much less salient forms of action. For all of these reasons, taxing now
is relatively certain, whereas taxing later is quite tentative.
2. The Time Value of Options
Taking the political-optionality metaphor literally, the longer the time to
maturity of an option, the greater its value.196 For a financial option,197 the logic
is that the longer the time until the option expires, the greater the likelihood
that the option will end up “in the money,” or with a strike price greater than
the current market “spot price” for a put option (and vice versa for a call
option).198
Political optionality has the character of a put option. The taxpayer has an
asset with built-in gain, and she could realize that gain today or tomorrow. If,
because of a change in the tax regime, tomorrow’s after-tax price could be higher

195. For discussion of this in regard to a proposed reform for New York State, see generally
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, David Gamage, Darien Shanske & Kirk Stark, Is New York’s Mark-to-Market Act
Unconstitutionally Retroactive?, 99 TAX NOTES ST. 541 (2021).
196. See, e.g., DAVID S. KIDWELL, DAVID W. BLACKWELL, DAVID. A. WHIDBEE & RICHARD
W. SIAS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND MONEY 323 (12th ed. 2017).
197. A financial option is a financial instrument that gives the holder the right to buy (call) or sell
(put) some underlying asset at a set “strike price” at some point in the future.
198. KIDWELL ET AL., supra note 196, at 323.
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than today’s (all else equal), then a rational taxpayer could wait to see—and
might even pay for the option of waiting.
In the context of tax reform, a future-assessment tax, assessed at the
present-value equivalent of a currently assessed tax, carries with it an option to
wait for a more favorable regime.199 Furthermore, as with financial options, the
longer the time until that future assessment, the greater the likelihood of a
taxpayer-favorable change—for example, by waiting for a congressional or
presidential election that shifts power in a taxpayer-favorable direction. If that
new Congress or new presidential appointees to key administrative agencies act
to minimize or repeal the future-assessed tax, the taxpayer can then “exercise”
the option to realize the gain under that new law.
To be clear, the path of legal change does not need to be monotonically in
favor of the taxpayer for this to work. It could be that one Congress passes a
future-assessment reform, and the next Congress makes it even stronger. But if
the Congress after that could weaken or repeal the reform, the option is still
valuable. Just as an asset price might be volatile, so might tax policy. Indeed,
the value of a financial option tends to increase with volatility in the price of
the underlying asset.200 All the taxpayer needs to do is wait for a favorable
moment to realize a gain201—and, as we discuss, history shows that taxpayers
tend to do exactly that.
Indeed, the option value that results from future-assessment tax reforms
is even easier to exercise than are financial options because taxpayers are often
given advance notice of upcoming political and legal changes as such changes
work their way through the legislative or administrative process. Whereas the
prices in financial markets are typically forward looking, taxpayers can often act
to recognize their deferred tax liabilities in advance of upcoming tax hikes or
strengthening of tax-base rules that rely on future assessment.
Then, by contrast to current-assessment reforms, later changes to a futureassessment regime are inherently retroactive with respect to deferred tax
liabilities. This is because, under a future-assessment regime, any economic
income or accruals to wealth will be “inchoate” until the time of realization.202
199. See Kamin & Oh, supra note 39, at 15; Alan J. Auerbach, Capital Gains Taxation in the United
States: Realizations, Revenue, and Rhetoric, 1988 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 595, 605
[hereinafter Auerbach, Capital Gains Taxation].
200. See, e.g., Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 637, 644–45 (1973); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON.
& MGM’T SCI. 141, 148 (1973).
201. To extend the metaphor, political optionality is like an “American” option, i.e., one that can
be exercised at any time, rather than a “European” option, i.e., one that can be exercised only on its
expiration date. See Black & Scholes, supra note 200, at 637.
202. The concept of “inchoate income” is generally considered incoherent from the perspective of
“economic income.” That is, all gains are income regardless of realization. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note
68, at 87. Nonetheless, the realization doctrine still means that economic income does not become “real”
for tax purposes until the tax law says so.
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Thus, even if the tax when realized carries with it an interest charge to cover
the time-value benefits of deferral, any gain will, for purposes of tax law
doctrine, still only be income in the year of realization.203 Consequently, if a
future Congress lowers the tax rate or the interest rate that applies to that gain,
this would implicitly have retroactive effects even though it would doctrinally
only apply to that year’s and future years’ realized income.204 Arguably more
importantly, the same is true if a future administrative agency creates or fails to
prevent a new tax-gaming opportunity for reducing or escaping the tax.
Therefore, if Congress is limited to enacting only future-assessment tax
reforms, the result would effectively be a partial one-way ratchet toward
weakening effective taxes on the ultra-wealthy. Any attempt to hike taxes on
the ultra-wealthy through future-assessment can be expected to result in greater
deferral of tax liabilities as taxpayers wait for future regimes more favorable to
them. And once such future changes happen, including changes in the form of
newly invented forms of tax gaming that are not effectively prevented by a
future Congress or by future administrative agencies, these changes will have
the effect of retroactively allowing income earned during earlier time periods
to escape tax.
Exacerbating all of these dynamics, ultra-wealthy taxpayers can and do
lobby and exert other political pressures to increase the likelihood that future
legal or political changes will be favorable to them, so as to increase the option
value they derive from the realization doctrine and from future-assessment
reforms.205 In this manner, the time value of options interacts with and
magnifies the other ways in which future-assessment reforms foster dynamics
that tend to result in these reforms eroding over time.
However, all of this changes in important ways if a Congress desiring to
hike taxes on the ultra-wealthy instead opts to do so through current-assessment
reforms. For instance, consider that a full deemed-realization mark-to-market
203. See, e.g., Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 335 (1929); Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset
Appreciation Be Taxed?: The Case for a Disposition Standard of Realization, 86 IND. L.J. 77, 78–89 (2011)
(discussing the history of the realization doctrine).
204. This is even more true—obviously so—for some reforms of loophole benefits, like the stepup in basis. If the step-up in basis is repealed one year and reinstated the next, the repeal would have
had no effect on anyone who had not died in the interim period.
205. See, e.g., Bob Lord, Does Our Tax System Benefit the Rich on Purpose?, INSIDESOURCES (Sept.
6, 2021), https://insidesources.com/does-our-tax-system-benefit-the-rich-on-purpose/ [https://perma.
cc/9AA8-PCA4]; Jonathan Chait, The Wealth Lobby Is Buying Up Democrats To Defeat Biden’s Tax Reform,
N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 9, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/09/wealth-lobby-buying-updemocrats-to-kill-bidens-tax-reform.html [https://perma.cc/2RNN-X772 (dark archive)]; Jesse
Drucker & Danny Hakim, Private Inequity: How a Powerful Industry Conquered the Tax System, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/12/business/private-equity-taxes.html [https://perma.cc/
863G-VDS4 (dark archive)] (Sept. 8, 2021); Justin Elliott & Robert Faturechi, Secret IRS Files Reveal
How Much the Ultrawealthy Gained by Shaping Trump’s “Big, Beautiful Tax Cut,” PROPUBLICA (Apr. 11,
2021), https://www.propublica.org/article/secret-irs-files-reveal-how-much-the-ultrawealthy-gainedby-shaping-trumps-big-beautiful-tax-cut [https://perma.cc/48SQ-ER3A].
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reform could include within its base all of the unrealized gains that were
deferred during the prior years in which the previous realization-based futureassessment regime governed.206 In this way, such a reform could be designed to
implicitly have retroactive effects even though it might doctrinally only apply
starting in the year of enactment (or perhaps starting in the tax year preceding
enactment). This is essentially the same way that future changes reducing the
effective taxation of the ultra-wealthy’s investment income currently have
implicit retroactive effects to prior year’s investment gains, as we explained
above.207 Thus, current-assessment reforms can transform what is currently a
partial one-way ratchet toward weakening effective taxes on the ultra-wealthy
into a full two-way ratchet capable of also strengthening effective taxes on the
ultra-wealthy.208
Future legal and political changes will inevitably happen—no tax reform
will remain permanently stable. Yet reliance on future-assessment reforms
creates powerful biases against effective taxation of the ultra-wealthy because
of the time value of options. Ultra-wealthy taxpayers can respond to futureassessment reforms they dislike by deferring their tax liabilities. Currentassessment reforms can counteract these biases by preventing or at least

206. For example, the proposed NY Billionaire Mark-to-Market Tax Act would do just that,
although only for billionaire taxpayers. See S. 8277, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020); David
Gamage, Emmanuel Saez & Darien Shanske, The NY Billionaire Mark-to-Market Tax Act: Revenue,
Economic, and Constitutional Analysis 1 (Sept. 1, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3766547 [https://perma.cc/D4P3-WE5L]; Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 195, at 541. A
prepayment mechanism built into a progressive consumption tax reform would also in essence rely on
deemed realization and so would similarly have implicit retroactive effects. Likewise, an annual wealth
tax reform would also have implicit retroactive effects, as the wealth accrued through gains in prior
years would be included in the tax base, although these retroactive effects would occur somewhat more
gradually over time as compared to a full deemed-realization reform.
207. See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text.
208. It may be worth noting that our analysis here is based on some implicit assumptions about
what sorts of retroactive reforms are plausible (we thank Daniel Shaviro for helpful discussions with
us on this point). Absent any constraints on retroactive reforms, there might not be as much difference
between current-assessment reforms and future-assessment reforms—because, for instance, a future
Congress enacting a future-assessment reform to hike taxes on the ultra-wealthy might in theory
include in the base of that reform gains that were realized in prior years and thereby already subject to
the lower rates governing in those prior years. However, current constitutional doctrines, federal
budget rules, and politics all make retroactive reforms of this sort impossible or at least implausible.
For instance, current constitutional doctrines generally permit retroactive reforms that go back to the
prior tax year or that only implicitly affect tax years before that, but current doctrine does not generally
allow revising tax rates or rules in a manner that would require taxpayers to recalculate taxes paid
through prior years’ returns (such as subjecting previously realized gains to new rates). See Avi-Yonah
et al., supra note 195, at 546–47. Thus, although our analysis depends on some implicit assumptions
about what sorts of retroactive reforms are plausible, these assumptions are grounded in current
constitutional law precedents, federal budget rules, and politics. Fully explaining how our analysis and
conclusions might change under different constitutional rules, budget rules, and political limitations
would be an interesting project but is well beyond the scope of this Article.
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deterring such deferral, thereby creating a more level playing field for future
changes affecting taxation of the ultra-wealthy.
3. Federal Budget Rules and Related Political Incentives
Fiscal institutions and budget accounting rules, though somewhat
technical and arcane, have very real effects on the politics of tax law and tax
reform. In particular, they can weaken future-assessment reforms in some
surprising ways. To see this requires first explaining a few basics of budget
policy and revenue scoring.
First, the CBO is required to “score”—provide a cost estimate of—bills
and resolutions approved by congressional committees.209 This is done using a
combination of the CBO’s own methodology and the revenue estimates of tax
bills produced by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.210 That “score”
is useful to legislators thinking about the overall budget, but it also affects the
application of various budget rules and targets.211
Second, one aspect of those budget rules is that revenue and cost estimates
generally only cover the “budget window” of, typically, the next ten years.212
Revenue and cost effects beyond those years do not appear in budget estimates
and are only relevant in a few circumstances.
Third, an important case when budget estimates outside the budget
window are relevant is in the context of “budget reconciliation.” This is a
process that allows budget-related bills to pass through expedited congressional
procedures (and no Senate filibuster), provided that they do not raise the
budget deficit in any of the “out years” beyond the budget window.213 This is
one reason why recent tax cuts have been written to only stay in effect for the
ten years after passage—to avoid increasing the deficit in years eleven and
beyond.214

209. Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 202, 88 Stat. 297, 304–05 (codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 602(c)(2)).
210. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., CBO’S COST ESTIMATES EXPLAINED 1–2 (2020), https://www.
cbo.gov/system/files/2020-02/56166-CBO-cost-estimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TUA-4GRS].
211. Id. at 2.
212. Under law, a congressional budget resolution must cover a window of the next five years, 2
U.S.C. § 632, but typical practice has been to estimate revenue and outlays over a ten-year period. See,
e.g., Budget and Economic Data, 10-Year Budget Projections, CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/
about/products/budget-economic-data [https://perma.cc/3WGN-RZY5].
213. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 310, 99
Stat. 1037, 1053–55 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 641); Ellen P. Aprill & Daniel J. Hemel, The
Tax Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye View, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 103–04 (2018).
214. See generally, e.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 26, 42, and
43 U.S.C.).
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What does this mean for future-assessment reform? Suppose Congress
passes a law that includes retrospective capital gains taxation for at least some
assets, like shares in closely held corporations or interests in partnerships.
Because that revenue would appear only in some future years, it would have a
muted revenue estimate for budget scoring purposes—some of the revenue
would likely show up only in the “out” years, and thus would not be part of the
official revenue estimate.
Suppose, for example, that in year one after the reform there is
appreciation in share values that, if taxed immediately, would raise $100 billion.
The future-assessment reform by assumption will raise $100 billion in present
value someday. But because of the timing of actual realizations, suppose that
only $60 billion will actually be collected in the next ten years. In that case, it
would be “scored” for budget purposes as only raising $60 billion. Recall that
we are still talking about current economic income—the actual taxation of gain
that occurs in year one might not happen until year eleven or beyond, and
therefore it would essentially have no budget effect, even though it will raise
$40 billion in present value. And given budget rules, like various caps and payas-you-go rules, it would be institutionally difficult to spend that $40 billion
before it is actually collected.215
If government accounting were more like business accounting, that future
tax revenue—the $40 billion of revenue outside the budget window—might at
least show up as a deferred tax asset on the government’s balance sheet—as
value that it would monetize in the future.216 If that were the case, then a future
legislative change destroying that value would impair that asset and show up as
a cost. Alas, that is not the case.217 Instead, and perversely, Congress could pass
a law that would lower the value of the tax asset—that is, would collect less than
the $40 billion that would have been expected—but would be scored as raising
revenue (or at least lowering revenue less than it really does).218
For example, suppose Congress repealed a future-assessment tax that
would have taxed gain at the present-value equivalent of a current-assessment
215. The federal government could of course borrow against that future revenue—the government
has essentially unlimited borrowing capacity. But the associated spending would still show up as outlay
without any offsetting revenue within the budget window.
216. See, e.g., FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE, INCOME
TAXES (TOPIC 740) 29–30 (2019), https://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/55/121964355.pdf [https://perma.
cc/898H-8QZQ].
217. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT 69 (2019), https://fiscal.treasury.gov/files/reports-statements/financial-report/2019/
FR-02272020(Final).pdf [https://perma.cc/3M8C-AX24].
218. See, e.g., J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-69-04, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 4520, THE “AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004,” at 5
(2004) (showing that a one-time 85% deduction for dividends received by a U.S. parent from a
controlled foreign corporation would raise $2.8 billion for the year it was in effect, partially offsetting
the projected revenue loss of $6 billion over the next nine years).
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tax and replaced it with a current-assessment tax, but at a far lower tax rate.
Let’s say the $40 billion that was expected to be raised (but which did not appear
in the original budget score) is reduced thereby to $10 billion, but that $10
billion is collected immediately and therefore within the budget window. For
budget purposes, Congress has now lost a lot of revenue in the out years—the
years beyond the ten-year budget window—but added a little revenue within
the budget window. The bill would be a net loser in present value by $30 billion
but could increase revenue estimates by $10 billion for budget scoring purposes.
This is a dynamic we saw play out, for example, in the taxation of the foreign
income of U.S. multinational corporations, discussed below.219
The reform need not be this dramatic for the same effect to exist. For
example, Congress could keep the future-assessment tax in place but simply
lower the tax rate or narrow the base that would apply upon realization. In a
static setting, that would seem to lower revenue uniformly. But in a dynamic
setting, the lower rate might induce some taxpayers to accelerate realization of
their previously deferred tax liabilities inside the budget window so as to take
advantage of those reduced rates or narrowed base, again making it appear as if
an overall revenue loser actually increases revenue.220
The effect of these deferred tax assets (to the government) or liabilities
(to taxpayers) goes beyond formal budget rules. The politics should be
obvious—a tax cut that does not impact the budget for favored priorities is a
win-win for most politicians.221 Moreover, as taxpayer deferred tax liabilities
accumulate, enforcement incentives change. In particular, taxpayers would
inevitably come up with new tax-gaming ideas for making use of their deferred
tax liabilities, and the larger the amount of accumulated deferred tax liabilities,
the more pressure there would likely be on the Treasury and IRS to be lax in
policing these new forms of tax gaming.222
By contrast, a current-assessment reform would immediately begin
generating tax revenue. Then, subsequently reducing the tax rates or narrowing
219. See infra Section III.C.2.
220. This is the opposite of the problem with raising current capital gains tax rates (absent a
current-assessment reform). See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
221. See David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in the United
States, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 295, 370 (2017) (explaining how when a proposed tax reform is estimated to
raise little revenue for the policymakers considering proposing the reform that this tends to make those
policymakers lose interest in the reform); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The Trouble with Tax
Increase Limitations, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 50, 79 (2013) (“There is ample evidence that voters desire
both lower taxes and increased spending on all of the major programs on which governments spend
significant resources.”).
222. As Daniel Hemel has explained, political pressures tend to bias the Treasury Department and
IRS toward using their regulatory authority mostly in taxpayer-favorable, revenue-losing directions,
because doing so “will be quite attractive to the President: if his administration acts on its own to
reduce taxes, the President will reap all the political benefits, while he and Congress will share the
political costs of spending cuts.” Hemel, The President’s Power, supra note 192, at 643.
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the base would be expensive because instead of reducing the value of the
government’s deferred tax assets (a nonbudgetary cost), there would be a
reduction in current tax revenue that would directly affect budget scoring.
Moreover, if that change were to also reduce tax revenue in the out years, it
could not be passed through the expedited budget reconciliation process.
All of this adds up to asymmetric institutional pressures. A currentassessment reform, once passed, becomes sticky—repealing it would cost real
money, in budget terms, and face a more difficult legislative process with more
stringent budget rules. By contrast, a future-assessment reform carries the seeds
of its own diminution, since scaling it back or repealing it would appear to cost
less in budget terms than it really does and could even score as increasing
revenue. These asymmetric pressures magnify the political-optionality benefits
to taxpayers from future-assessment reforms by making it substantially more
likely that law or policy will move in the direction of reducing the future
taxation of deferred tax liabilities.
The indirect effects related to the political incentives of building coalitions
around the spending of tax revenues further exacerbate these asymmetric
institutional pressures. This is because tax revenue generated today—such as
through a current-assessment reform—can be used to fund public spending or
other policy goals, which would likely then generate a political constituency
with the motivation to defend this new revenue source.
We discussed above the typical dynamic of concentrated costs and diffuse
benefits that characterizes repealing tax benefits for the ultra-wealthy.223 One
way to counteract that, at least partially, is to use the new revenue stream to
create a constituency that would lose something if the new revenue source were
lost.224 Yet a future-assessment reform, by contrast, would in most
circumstances not be able to appropriate the tax revenues it might eventually
raise until some theoretical future date. One can see this dynamic by comparing
the opposition to the ACA in 2010—before any benefits had been delivered—
with the unsuccessful attempts to repeal the law in 2017. Before benefit delivery
began, public opposition was fairly strong, but by the time Congress tried to
repeal in 2017, there were enough people benefiting from the law to make repeal
too politically costly.225
Of course, Congress could choose to borrow in advance of receiving that
revenue to start distributing the benefits sooner. Indeed, that might be the
financially rational thing to do, if the future revenue were assured. But, as noted
223. See supra notes 187–92 and accompanying text.
224. Susannah Camic Tahk, Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2683,
2699–700, 2702 (2013).
225. See, e.g., Dylan Scott, Trump’s Biggest Midterm Blunder: Embracing Obamacare Repeal, VOX
(Nov. 7, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/7/18070152/midtermelections-2018-results-trump-obamacare-repeal [https://perma.cc/KY5R-4HSU].
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above, budget accounting and budget politics do not generally provide for a
clean way to do that because the spending would not be funded by offsetting
revenues that count for budget scoring purposes. Thus, without a constituency
directly benefiting from the future-assessment revenue stream, repeal would
have diminished political cost—just as it would also have diminished budget
cost.
B.

Prior Future-Assessment Proposals

We believe there is a strong theoretical case for current-assessment
reforms, compared to future-assessment reforms, as discussed in the prior
subsection. However, the prior literature has generally concluded that more
conventional (realization-based) future-assessment reforms should suffice for
fixing the personal tax system, so that current-assessment reforms have typically
been viewed as unnecessary and thus not worth pursuing.226 To flesh out our
theoretical argument, we now examine two prominent categories of futureassessment reforms in more detail: (1) retrospective capital gains tax reforms
(including hybrids of partial mark-to-market and retrospective capital gains tax
reforms), and (2) progressive consumption tax reforms.
We focus here in particular on reforms that address the time-value benefits
of deferral, since these are the trickiest problems to solve. By contrast, there are
numerous proposals for ending at least some of the major loophole benefits of
deferral (the other category of existing-law benefits of deferral).227 For example,
repeal of the § 1014 step-up in basis would be relatively straightforward—at
least in terms of legislative drafting. The primary obstacles instead are the
political difficulty of accomplishing it and then sustaining it. As we will explain
below, the history of prior attempts to repeal the basis step-up illustrate the
dangers of political optionality. And we believe those same dangers also arise with
these more comprehensive future-assessment reform proposals that we will
discuss below.
The reform proposals below would—if they remained politically stable—
end (or at least make irrelevant) the time-value benefits of deferral. However, as
we will elaborate, these proposals would retain the political-optionality benefit of
deferral. That is, because these proposals would continue to use realization as
the time of tax assessment, the actual collection of tax would often occur in later
time periods than when income is earned (or when wealth or spending power is
accumulated). As a result, these proposals would be vulnerable to later political
or legal changes undermining the actual collection of tax.

226. See supra note 23.
227. See supra note 23.
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1. Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation
A realization-based tax system can, at least in theory, counteract the timevalue benefits of deferral by instituting an additional charge at the time of
realization that reflects the time value of money during the deferral period—
essentially an interest charge that covers the time from when the income was
earned to when it is taxed. The seminal modern proposal of this type came from
Alan Auerbach.228 Auerbach’s proposal has since been praised and elaborated on
by many other academics and analysts.229
Auerbach’s proposal is actually more nuanced than simply an interest
charge. Prior retrospective proposals, especially that of William Vickrey in
1939, imagined knowing how much unrealized gain was earned in a given year,
and thus how much tax would have been owed on realization.230 The
government could then just treat that unpaid tax as a loan and charge interest
accordingly, repeating each year. The catch, as Auerbach points out, is that this
would require knowing the value of the asset at each point in time, which we
often do not.231
Auerbach suggested a different approach. He was primarily concerned
with the lock-in effect—the incentive that taxpayers have, at any given moment
in time, to hold an asset and thus defer tax, rather than sell it and be taxed.232
The goal of Auerbach’s proposal was “holding-period neutrality,” a world
where, at any given point in time, taxpayers would be indifferent between
holding or selling assets.233 If the lock-in effect could be removed, that would
eliminate some of the welfare costs of the realization doctrine. Auerbach
demonstrated how to achieve holding-period neutrality with a formula that uses
only the asset value at realization, the tax rate, the holding period, and the riskfree interest rate, and without needing to know asset values during the holding
period. This formula computes a tax upon realization that increases the longer
the holding period.234
228. See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167, 167 (1991)
[hereinafter Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains]; see also Alan J. Auerbach & David F. Bradford,
Generalized Cash-Flow Taxation, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 957, 958 (2004).
229. See, e.g., Kwak, supra note 23, at 191; Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for
Retrospective Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 45, 85–86 (1996); David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization
Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency, and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX L. REV.
731, 738 (1994).
230. William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income-Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL. ECON. 379, 383–89
(1939).
231. Indeed, in the current era, retrospective proposals are almost uniformly directed at illiquid
assets, where annual accrual taxation would be too inaccurate. If the value is known, as with publicly
traded assets, we can instead use mark-to-market schemes.
232. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains, supra note 228, at 167.
233. Id. at 169.
234. Id. at 170. In the simple case where there are no cash flows from the asset, just an increase in
value, Auerbach’s formula for a tax liability at time s is TS = (1 – e-tis)AS, where t is the tax rate, i is the
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Auerbach’s proposal was designed to avoid the liquidity and valuation
problems that the prior literature has generally viewed as being the primary
disadvantages of current-assessment reforms.235 As Auerbach has noted,
however, retrospective capital gains taxation alone is not sufficient to end the
existing-law benefits of deferral without other reforms, most importantly
repealing the step-up in basis at death.236 This is because retrospective capital
gains taxation cannot solve the problem of a legal rule that simply erases a large
portion of the tax base.
But that limitation points to the larger problems caused by the politicaloptionality benefits of deferral. By leaving intact the taxpayer’s choice as to
when the tax will apply (even if the amount of the tax is calculated so as to
theoretically be timing neutral), retrospective capital gains tax reforms would
allow taxpayers the option to wait for future legal changes beneficial to them.237
The problems that the political-optionality benefits of deferral pose for
full retrospective capital gains tax proposals also apply to hybrids of partial
mark-to-market and retrospective capital gains tax proposals, although
potentially to a somewhat lesser degree. Most of the proposals in the prior
literature for mark-to-market style reforms would actually only enact a partial
mark-to-market system that would apply mostly just to publicly traded
securities.238 With respect to other, harder-to-value assets, most of these
proposals would then apply a retrospective capital gains tax reform.
risk-free interest rate, and AS is the value of the asset at time s. Conceptually, the tax system taxes the
investor as if the asset had grown at the risk-free rate to reach the value of AS. The idea is that at any
given point in time, a rational investor should be indifferent at the margin before taxes between
investing in a risky and a risk-free asset, which implies a risk-adjusted expected rate of return for the
risky asset equal to the risk-free rate. If that is so, then telling the investor that they will pay tax in the
future on that risk-free return regardless of whether they sell or hold should make them indifferent
after taxes too.
235. Id. at 168.
236. See Alan J. Auerbach, Reforming Capital Gains Taxation, 135 TAX NOTES 1399, 1399 (2012).
237. Auerbach’s version of retrospective capital gains taxation has other problems as well. A large
one is that it taxes from an ex-ante perspective rather than an ex-post perspective, meaning that those
who ended up with especially large extranormal returns would end up being taxed relatively lightly as
a percentage of their actual gains. See Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains, supra note 228, at 176–77.
This is especially concerning if our motivation is to more effectively tax the ultra-wealthy—by
definition, the big ex-post winners.
238. See Kleinbard, The Right Tax, supra note 33, at 354 (“Nearly every such proposal limits its
reach to publicly traded instruments . . . .”); WYDEN, supra note 169 (discussing the 2019 version of
Senator Wyden’s hybrid of a mark-to-market and a retrospective capital gains tax reform proposal).
Note that, after this Article was accepted for publication, the authors worked with Senator Wyden’s
staff on developing a revised version of his prior reform proposal that then became the “Billionaires
Income Tax Reform,” publicly released in October 2021. See Wyden Unveils Billionaires Income Tax,
U.S. S. COMM. ON FIN. (Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/wydenunveils-billionaires-income-tax [https://perma.cc/UF3Y-R3SS]. Had it been enacted, the proposed
Billionaires Income Tax Reform of 2021 (“BIT”) would have only applied to billionaire taxpayers and
would have combined a mark-to-market regime for tradable assets with a retrospective regime for
nontradeable assets, along with rules designed to shut down all of the major current-law loopholes as
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However, taking account of the political-optionality benefits of deferral,
sophisticated taxpayers would likely expect that future legal or political changes
would eventually undermine the retrospective capital gains tax component of
such a reform, so that sophisticated taxpayers would potentially still face
incentives to shift their investments away from assets subject to the mark-tomarket component of the reform toward those subject to the retrospective
capital gains component. For this reason, although a hybrid of a partial markto-market and a retrospective capital gains tax reform might well be a
substantial improvement over the current income tax system, we doubt that
such a reform (on its own) could succeed at sustainably fixing how the income
tax is currently broken.
2. Progressive Consumption Taxation
An alternative realization-based approach for eliminating the time-value
benefits of deferral involves abandoning the attempt to tax time-value returns
altogether. Various approaches for progressive consumption tax reform
proposals have been designed to accomplish this, with specific versions of these
proposals often labeled as personal expenditure tax reforms, progressive
spending tax reforms, and cash-flow consumption tax reforms, among other
labels.239
Although specific design elements vary, these different consumption tax
proposals generally share two key features: first, including in the tax base only
funds used for consumption, at the time that these funds are used for
consumption; and second, eliminating the tax on the risk-free time-value
returns to holding wealth, specifically, the return that is due only to the value
that comes from having the wealth today rather than tomorrow.240 By taxing
funds only once when withdrawn to fund consumption, the ultimate tax is the
applied to billionaires’ nontradeable assets. Our overall assessment is that the BIT would have been a
substantial improvement to the existing personal tax system, and we strongly supported the proposed
BIT. However, our view is also that, had the BIT been enacted, it would likely have then been
substantially eroded over time as a result of the political-optionality dynamics that we explain in this
Article. For that reason, we think that it would have fallen short of offering a sustainable fix to the
brokenness of the existing personal tax system—for that, we think a complete current-assessment
reform is needed.
239. See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, A Supplemental Expenditure Tax for Canada, 67 CANADIAN TAX J.
711, 711 (2019) (exploring a “cash flow consumption tax”); Edward J. McCaffery & James R. Hines,
The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2010) (arguing for a
“progressive spending tax”); Alan D. Viard, Fundamental Tax Reform: A Comparison of Three Options, in
THE ECONOMICS OF TAX POLICY 341, 344 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kent Smetters eds., 2017)
(considering a “personal expenditure tax”).
240. Under most versions of these sorts of reform proposals, supernormal returns (or “economic
rents”) would still be included in the tax base. Many commentators also argue that “risky returns” do
not face an effective tax burden under an income tax and therefore can be ignored, though this is not a
universal view. See John R. Brooks, Taxation, Risk, and Portfolio Choice: The Treatment of Returns to Risk
Under a Normative Income Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 255, 256 (2013).
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same in present-value terms no matter when the funds are withdrawn, thereby
eliminating any financial time-value benefits to deferral.
Furthermore, well-designed consumption tax reform proposals would
generally also change the tax rules governing borrowing, so that borrowing
money to fund consumption would generate the same tax as would selling assets
to fund consumption.241 Thus, taxpayers like Larry Ellison (who, as we
previously explained,242 has funded around $10 billion of untaxed consumption
through borrowing) should face much higher effective tax rates under a welldesigned progressive consumption tax than under the existing income tax.
However, as with retrospective capital gains taxation, progressive
consumption tax reforms would retain the realization-based nature of the
personal tax system by allowing for separation in time between the point at
which the power to spend is accumulated and when it is taxed.243 This thus
retains the political-optionality benefits of deferral.
It may perhaps seem odd to describe a tax on current consumption as being
a future-assessment reform. But because consumption generally occurs at a point
after income has been earned, and thus also after the power to spend has been
accumulated, a consumption tax is assessed in the future with respect to both
income and the accumulation of spending power. We can thus analytically
distinguish the base that is to be taxed over a taxpayer’s lifetime (here, total
lifetime consumption) from the points in time at which that tax is to be assessed
and collected.
The typical consumption tax proposal uses the times when actual
consumption occurs to impose tax, but we could imagine a current-assessment
version of a progressive consumption tax that would instead impose tax at the
times in which spending power accumulates. Thus, to transform any of the
major progressive consumption tax reform proposals into a current-assessment
reform, all that is needed is to add a prepayment or withholding mechanism
that would assess and collect tax as the power to spend accumulates. These
prepaid or withheld (currently-assessed) tax payments could then be reconciled

241. This is often held out as a major advantage of progressive consumption taxation over income
taxation—one could not pursue the usual “buy, borrow, die” strategy. See, e.g., McCaffery, A New
Understanding of Tax, supra note 1, at 878–80.
242. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
243. By delaying when money received is used to fund consumption, a taxpayer can create a
separation in time between when money is received by the taxpayer and when that money is realized
and reported as taxable under a consumption tax. This is still deferral and allows the taxpayer to defer
tax while waiting for favorable (to the taxpayer) future legal changes. Whether we call this receipt of
money “income” or “wealth accumulation” or something else, the key is that taxpayers can receive
money along with control of that money, and then defer any tax on those receipts by delaying
consumption.
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with the final assessment of tax that could be calculated when funds are
withdrawn to pay for actual consumption.244
Because the progressive consumption tax proposals in the prior literature
lack such mechanisms, we label them future-assessment reforms. Under any of
these proposals, a taxpayer could just wait for a tax rate reduction or a narrowing
of the tax base before withdrawing funds for consumption and thereby
subjecting those funds to tax. Because taxpayers could opt to postpone
withdrawing funds for consumption until a later period, they could simply wait
for a more favorable Congress or IRS. To be sure, many taxpayers have much
less ability to defer actual consumption than they do to just defer realization
under the rules of the existing income tax. Thus, strategic deferral might be
somewhat less available as a tax planning strategy under a well-designed
progressive consumption tax than under either the existing income tax or a
retrospective capital gains tax. Indeed, this is part of the normative arguments
typically made in favor of using consumption as a tax base.245
However, the ultra-wealthy differ from more ordinary taxpayers and—
almost by definition—have more wealth than they are likely to ever consume.
Many of the ultra-wealthy would thus be able to strategically time at least large
portions of their withdrawals following any of these progressive consumption
tax reforms. In particular, future heirs would have a strong incentive to lobby
hard for future rate changes or exemptions, knowing that most of their
consumption would come in later time periods.
Thus, the likelihood that future consumption would eventually come to be
taxed at lower effective rates due to political or legal changes would almost
certainly lead many ultra-wealthy taxpayers to defer substantial portions of
their tax liabilities. This would then result in essentially the same dynamics as

244. We plan to elaborate on how proposals of this sort could work in future scholarship. Daniel
Hemel (among others) has previously explained how a prepayment or withholding mechanism of this
sort could work in the context of a retrospective capital gains tax reform. Hemel, Taxing Wealth, supra
note 39, at 768–69.
245. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC
ECONOMY 161–73 (1959) (covering arguments for the proper “index of equality”).
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with retrospective capital gains tax reforms,246 although perhaps to a
comparatively lesser degree.247
C.

Historical Examples of Political Optionality in Action

To further explain why we are skeptical of future-assessment reforms that
would leave intact the political-optionality benefits of deferral, we next discuss
lessons that can be drawn from tax history. Specifically, we consider three sets
of historical examples where political optionality undermined important aspects
of the tax system: (1) capital gains tax rate fluctuations, (2) tax holidays related
to the repatriation of foreign-source income, and (3) stepped-up basis reform
efforts.
Each of these historical examples illustrates a slightly different aspect of
the problems posed by the political-optionality benefits of deferral, and
together they tell a strong cautionary tale against any reform that would act to
limit only the existing-law benefits of deferral without also limiting the
political-optionality benefits of deferral. Specifically, the history of taxpayer
responses to capital gains tax rate fluctuations reveals the extent to which
taxpayers can be expected to change their behavior in response to future legal
changes and even just the possibility of such changes. The history of the
repatriation of the foreign-source income of controlled foreign corporations
then clarifies how the political-optionality benefits of deferral on their own
(even in the absence of any existing-law benefits of deferral) can create powerful
incentives for taxpayers to defer realizing income. And, finally, the history of
attempts at reforming the provision for stepped-up basis shows the

246. Edward Kleinbard has made a limited version of this argument in a few paragraphs of his
prior work. Kleinbard, The Right Tax, supra note 33, at 232–33. In particular, Kleinbard focuses on the
concern that, following the enactment of a progressive consumption tax reform, Congress would see
large amounts of invested wealth build up and not spent or realized, and so would then be unable to
resist the temptation to create tax holidays, especially during economic downturns. See id. We agree
with Kleinbard on this point, but we view this as only a portion of the broader problems that the
political-optionality benefits of deferral pose for progressive consumption tax reforms. As we explained
in Section III.A.1, inertia and drift are the dominant feature of tax politics, and it is thus much easier
for a coalition to defeat attempts to modify previously enacted tax reforms than to create new
modifications. Consequently, what is likely to be the most important dimension of the problems that
the political-optionality benefits of deferral pose for progressive consumption tax reforms arises from
the near inevitability of taxpayers eventually devising tax-gaming stratagems capable of granting them
access to their deferred tax liabilities without triggering tax, followed by a failure to adequately police
these stratagems. For some examples of how this could happen, see Gamage, The Case for Taxing, supra
note 86, at 428–29.
247. Whether a progressive consumption tax reform would result in these sorts of dynamics to a
comparatively lesser, or a comparatively greater, degree is hard to say, and would depend on the design
of the progressive consumption tax reform, among other factors. Notably, many of the most prominent
proposals for progressive consumption tax reforms would involve full expensing of asset purchases to
replace depreciation, which could result in much greater deferral of tax liabilities as compared to either
the existing income tax or a retrospective capital gains tax.
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unsustainability of attempting to end the major loophole benefits of deferral
absent current-assessment reforms and, more generally, how reform attempts
that would rely on future assessment can be highly vulnerable to political attack.
1. Capital Gains Tax Rate Fluctuations
Legislators regularly tinker with tax rates, whether to achieve revenue
targets, distributional goals, constituent demands, economic incentives, or other
goals. This includes not just tax rates on capital gains, but also ordinary income,
corporate income, and more. Indeed, rates on ordinary and corporate income
have varied over a wider range than capital gains. Since 1982, the top statutory
marginal rate on ordinary income has varied between 28% and 50%,248 and the
top corporate rate has varied between 21% and 46%.249 In that same period, the
top capital gains rate has fluctuated between 15% and 29%.250
Nevertheless, due to the realization doctrine, we should expect capital
gains rate changes to influence behavior far more than changes to ordinary
income or corporate income. This is because it is relatively easy to shift the
timing of capital gains realization forward or backward to maximize tax benefits,
but harder to do so for most business and salary income. And, indeed, past
experience with rate changes has shown that there is a relatively high elasticity
(that is, taxpayer responsiveness) of capital gains realizations to the tax rate,
particularly from transitory rate changes.251 In other words, taxpayers—and
especially sophisticated taxpayers—clearly do plan their capital gains
realizations strategically in the face of rate changes.252
For example, in 1987 the capital gains rate went up from 20% to 28%, and
as a result, capital gains realizations spiked in 1986, the year before the increase,
and then dropped to an even lower level during the 1987–1997 period.253 We
248. See Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates: 1913 to 2020, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 4, 2020),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-highest-marginal-income-tax-rates [https://perma
.cc/XEL4-XJQR].
249. See Jack Taylor, Corporation Income Tax Brackets and Rates, 1909–2002, 23 SOI BULL.
284, 288–89 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02corate.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7Z5-BUSF]
(showing range of 35–46% between 1981 and 2002). The corporate tax as of this writing is 21%. See
I.R.C. § 11(b).
250. See Historical Capital Gains and Taxes: 1954 to 2014, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 4, 2017),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-capital-gains-and-taxes [https://perma.cc/4VQZ3QCN]. After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there was even a 33% “bubble rate” that applied to taxpayers
just below the highest income group, intended to offset the advantages of the lower marginal rates on
smaller income amounts. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101(g)(1), 100 Stat. 2085,
2097 (repealed). This was intended to achieve the effect of a flat 28% for the higher income groups,
and so we treat 28% as the top rate for that period.
251. See Auerbach, Capital Gains Taxation, supra note 199, at 595.
252. Alan J. Auerbach & Jonathan M. Siegel, Capital-Gains Realizations of the Rich and Sophisticated,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 276, 280–81 (2000).
253. TIMOTHY DOWD & ROBERT MCCLELLAND, THE BUNCHING OF CAPITAL GAINS
REALIZATIONS 2 (2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/138266/2001
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saw similar behavior in 2012, the year before the 15% capital gains rate increased
to 20%,254 and also in 2017, when taxpayers assumed that rate cuts or other tax
breaks would be coming in that year’s tax reform bill.255 Sophisticated
taxpayers—who hold most of the capital gain-producing assets256—have
repeatedly shown that they will time realizations based on anticipated tax
changes.
The regular fluctuation of capital gains tax rates also reveals a different—
but related—type of behavior. David Kamin and Jason Oh apply an analysis
similar to our own to argue that capital gains rate uncertainty itself generates a
return to deferral because of the option value of a potential future lower rate.257
They argue, for example, that if the current capital gains rate is relatively high,
then a taxpayer might reasonably guess that in a future year, the rate could
revert toward the historical mean, thus creating an incentive to defer realization
until that future year.258 When the taxpayer has a long time horizon, the
likelihood of some future year having a lower rate increases, thus also increasing
the incentive to wait.259 How much this behavior occurs in practice is an
empirical question that requires further study, but the logic is compelling and
dovetails with other common tax planning strategies, such as deferring
compensation until future, lower tax-bracket years.260
2. Repatriation Holidays
A similar option value to waiting is at play in the choices of multinational
corporations for when to “repatriate” the income earned by their foreign
subsidiaries back to the U.S. parent corporation. Because even related
corporations are treated as separate legal entities, the income earned by a
148-the-bunching-of-capital-gains-realizations.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5WJ-TRN5] (citing Treasury
Department data).
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Max Ehrenfreund & Damian Paletta, Americans Are Taking Their Sweet Time Paying
Taxes, and the Government Is Running Out of Cash, WASH. POST (June 1, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/06/01/americans-are-taking-their-sweet-time-paying-taxesand-the-government-is-running-out-of-cash/ [https://perma.cc/XST9-3J5N (dark archive)].
256. See supra Section I.A.
257. Kamin & Oh, supra note 39, at 15.
258. Id. at 12–14.
259. Kamin and Oh also introduce the step-up in basis into their model. If a person is close to
death, there is much less uncertainty about the future capital gains rate, since it will be 0% shortly.
That decreases the uncertainty, but increases even more the incentive to wait, as we discuss below. If
anticipated death is farther away, a taxpayer might decide to take advantage of a low-rate year in the
interim. Id. at 19–20.
260. This is the primary reason a person would choose a traditional 401(k) or IRA plan over a
“Roth”-style 401(k) or IRA plan, for example. See, e.g., Kristin Mckenna, Roth 401(k) vs Traditional
401(k): Investing Pre-Tax or After-Tax, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2020, 9:47 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/kristinmckenna/2020/10/19/roth-401k-vs-traditional-401k-investing-pre-tax-or-after-tax/?sh=44
99b3d334a3 [https://perma.cc/7U8H-62RG].

100 N.C. L. REV. 487 (2022)

2022]

TAX NOW OR TAX NEVER

547

controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) does not become U.S. source income
of the parent corporation until the subsidiary actually pays a dividend to the
parent.261 Prior to 2018,262 that decision carried heavy tax consequences,
analogous to the realization doctrine for capital gains—by simply not having
the CFC distribute a dividend to the U.S. parent, the U.S. parent could avoid
paying current U.S. tax.
As with the capital gain income of U.S. individuals, the timing of a
repatriation dividend was almost entirely voluntary. There is little nontax cost
from failing to repatriate—if the parent corporation needs capital, for example,
it does not matter that some cash is trapped offshore in a CFC because the fact
that it had offshore cash holdings makes it easier to raise money in the capital
markets. And in the case of public companies, shareholders need not wait for a
dividend to get access to the profits, since they could just sell shares on the
market instead (or borrow against the shares, as described above).
But the repatriation case also departs from the individual capital gains case
in an important way. In the case of individual capital gains, deferral also
generates a time-value financial benefit. As we have discussed, that existing-law
benefit is on top of the political-optionality benefits of also waiting for a
favorable legal change. With repatriation, however, the time-value benefits of
deferral were often not present—all that was available to multinational
corporations in many circumstances were the political-optionality benefits. Yet,
as discussed below, this was still more than enough to dramatically affect their
behavior.
To elaborate, tax scholars have shown that, if a business enterprise faces a
similar corporate tax rate and access to investment in the foreign jurisdiction as
in the United States, then there really is not a time-value financial benefit of
deferring repatriation.263 This is because the cash in question would be earning
a similar return while being held by the CFC, and that return would be taxed
at a similar rate in the interim. Moreover, when the dividend was finally paid,
it would be larger (by the after-foreign tax rate of return), and thus the tax
collected on that dividend would also be larger. It can be shown with simple
math that this is equivalent to repatriating the dividend earlier and then
investing that cash in the United States.264 The only factors that matter are the
rates of return and the tax rates in the two jurisdictions, not the timing of the
dividend.
For sure, multinationals have been quite aggressive about lowering their
effective foreign tax rates through international structuring or simply housing

261.
262.
263.
264.

See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 31–32 (2014).
See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
See SHAVIRO, supra note 261, at 82–84.
Id.
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the CFC in a low- or no-tax jurisdiction.265 But the evidence shows that
multinationals were also keeping cash offshore even in high-tax jurisdictions.266
Why was that, if in fact there were no time-value financial benefits from doing
so?267
The answer, of course, comes from the political-optionality benefits of
deferral. In 2004, when U.S. corporations had perhaps $500 billion of cash held
in offshore subsidiaries,268 Congress enacted a repatriation “holiday,” a low
5.25% tax rate on dividends paid by CFCs during 2005 and 2006 (as opposed
to the then-existing 35% tax rate on corporate income).269 Congress’s theory was
presumably that a one-time holiday would allow the offshore cash to come home
and be reinvested in the United States270 (notwithstanding the fact that much
of that cash was already in dollar-denominated accounts at U.S. banks and often
invested in U.S. Treasuries).271 And if corporations were told it was a one-time
holiday, they would change their behavior going forward and not keep hoarding
cash offshore.
The foreseeable result, however, was that U.S. corporations instead
became even more emboldened to aggressively hoard cash offshore after 2006
and to then start lobbying for yet another repatriation holiday.272 In effect,
Congress had signaled that a future lower rate was politically possible, meaning
that the probability-weighted expected future tax rate immediately decreased.
By thereby increasing the political-optionality benefit of deferral, Congress
increased the likelihood that corporations would continue to delay repatriation.
265. See, e.g., INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y, FACT SHEET: APPLE AND TAX AVOIDANCE
(2017), https://itep.sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/applefactsheet1117.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PJM-LSF
9].
266. See SHAVIRO, supra note 261, at 85–87.
267. Another possible explanation is that there was an accounting benefit to keeping money
offshore if the corporation could claim that the money was “permanently reinvested earnings.” Id. at
86. In that case, there would not be current tax charged for the deferred income, thus giving a boost to
reported earnings. Id.
268. See Glenn R. Simpson & Gregory Zuckerman, Tax Windfall May Not Boost Hiring Despite
Claims, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2004, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109763358839943873
[https://perma.cc/CCY3-3B4Q (dark archive)].
269. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 422(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1514–19
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 965). The new § 965 provided for an 85% dividends-received
deduction, meaning that only 15% of repatriated dividends were subject to the then-current corporate
tax rate of 35%. Id. That is equivalent to a 5.25% tax rate on 100% of the dividend.
270. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 146 (2004).
271. See U.S. S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, OFFSHORE FUNDS LOCATED
ONSHORE: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ADDENDUM 4–5 (2011), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/Repatriation%20Report%20ADDENDUM%20(FINAL).pdf [https://perma.cc/N6JY-FR8
A].
272. See John Aloysius Farrell & Aaron Mehta, Wealthy Corporations with a Trillion Dollars Stashed
Offshore Lobby for a ‘Holiday’ from U.S. Taxes, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, https://publicintegrity.org/
politics/wealthy-corporations-with-a-trillion-dollars-stashed-offshore-lobby-for-a-holiday-from-u-staxes/ [https://perma.cc/E7N4-5TEQ] (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM).
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And indeed, even though around $360 billion was repatriated under this
provision,273 offshore cash holdings quickly shot back up, exceeding $2 trillion
by 2017.274
The corporations’ bet on the political-optionality benefits of deferral
ultimately paid off. Congress came close to passing another repatriation holiday
in 2009,275 but then in 2017 enacted a holiday as a part of the general shift to a
modified territorial regime.276 The huge influx of cash to U.S. parent
corporations that followed was the likely cause of the burst of share repurchases
during 2018.277
Because of the shift to a modified territorial regime—that is, one in which
foreign-source income, such as the profits of a CFC, are taxed only in the source
jurisdiction—we may not see this pattern repeated in the future, at least to the
same degree. But we nevertheless look to this example to highlight that the
political-optionality benefits of deferral are real and can dramatically affect
taxpayer behavior in predictable ways. If a person or corporation can easily
choose when to realize income, and if there is even a chance that the effective
tax rate on that income will be lower in the future than today, the strategic
choice is obvious and easy to implement. Moreover, when the taxpayer’s own
behavior can affect the likelihood of a future lower rate coming about—through
lobbying or other political activity—it becomes even more clear what the
taxpayer will likely do.
3. Stepped-Up Basis Reform Efforts
As we have noted repeatedly, § 1014’s provision for stepped-up basis upon
death is perhaps the most important of the loophole benefits of deferral under
existing law. Because of that provision, if an individual or family taxpayer can
avoid realizing gains during their lifetimes, the gains will be wiped out at death
when the asset is passed to the taxpayer’s heirs.
The problematic nature of § 1014 is well known, and few defend it on a
normative basis. Stanley Surrey, for example, called it “the most serious defect

273. Melissa Redmiles, The One-Time Received Dividend Deduction, 27 SOI BULL. 103 (2008),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08codivdeductbul.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DJL-HDZP].
274. See INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y, FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES HOLD A RECORD $2.6
TRILLION OFFSHORE *1 (2017), https://itep.sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/pre0327.pdf [https://perma.
cc/DT8J-TC2P].
275. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Repatriation Aid for the Financial Crisis?, 53
TAX NOTES INT’L 275, 276 (2009).
276. See, e.g., J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-50-17, DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND
JOBS ACT” 249 (2017) (describing the shift to a “participation exemption system” in which dividends
from CFC’s would be exempt from U.S. tax in most cases).
277. See, e.g., Emily Stewart, Stock Buybacks, Explained, VOX (Aug. 5, 2018, 3:14 PM), https://www.
vox.com/2018/8/2/17639762/stock-buybacks-tax-cuts-trump-republicans [https://perma.cc/3EGX-96
CR].
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in the federal tax structure” fifty years ago.278 And, in theory, the solution is
simple: replace the basis step-up with a carryover basis regime—that is, where
the basis of the asset remains the same as it passes from decedent to recipient—
as already exists for gifts made during a donor’s life,279 or, alternatively, treat
death as a realization event for the decedent. Such reforms have been proposed
numerous times over the years, as discussed below, and have even been partially
enacted—yet they never last.
As Larry Zelenak and others have noted, under the original income tax in
1918, all transfers by gift or bequest resulted in a step-up in basis, though this
was because of Treasury guidance, not because of any statutory law.280 In the
Revenue Act of 1921, Congress then codified the current split treatment, with
a carryover basis for inter vivos gifts but with the step-up at death.281 At that
time, the primary argument for the step-up at death was to avoid double
taxation when most applicable taxpayers were also subject to the estate tax.
Because there was no federal gift tax at the time, the issue cut the other way for
inter vivos gifts—a carryover basis rule allowed for income taxation of gifts, since
they were not included in the estate tax.282
So the particular reform put in place in 1921 had a logic to it at the time.
But—as an illustration of the sort of policy drift that we discussed above—that
logic became obsolete by at least 1932, when the gift tax was added
permanently,283 and certainly by 1944, when Congress made the wartime
expansion of the income tax permanent.284 As a result, the income tax went from
covering 5% of households to 56% of households by 1946 and continued to grow
from there.285 Income taxpayers and estate taxpayers were no longer the same
households, and gifts were no longer exempt from wealth-transfer taxes, and so
the original logic for the step-up at death no longer applied.

278. Jerome Kurtz & Stanley S. Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Proposals,
the Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1381 (1970).
279. I.R.C. § 1015.
280. See Larry Zelenak, The Tax-Free Basis Step-Up at Death, the Charitable Deduction for
Unrealized Appreciation, and the Persistence of Error 4–8 (unpublished manuscript), https://web.law.
columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-theory-workshop/tax-workshop/zelenakfreebasis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KP93-RERJ].
281. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(a)(2), 42 Stat. 227, 229 (repealed).
282. See Zelenak, supra note 280, at 12–14.
283. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 501, 47 Stat. 169, 245 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). There was also a gift tax in place from 1924 to 1926. Revenue Act of
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 319, 43 Stat. 253, 313 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.); see also Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The List History of Estate and Gift Taxation, 9 FLA.
TAX REV. 875, 885–902 (2010).
284. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-315, 58 Stat. 231 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
285. LAWRENCE H. SELTZER, THE PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS IN THE INCOME TAX 62 tbl.9
(1968).
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In 1942, Treasury tried to get Congress to enact a carryover basis
provision, and, in both 1963 and 1969, Treasury (with Surrey as Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy) pushed a detailed realization-at-death provision
instead, but in the face of opposition, these proposals each went nowhere.286 In
1976, the first real change occurred, with a carryover basis provision, § 1023,
replacing § 1014.287 The provision had a number of exceptions to carryover basis
treatment, including for life insurance and annuity policies, and it also provided
a minimum basis of $60,000 (so still a pretty large step-up in 1976, even if not
to full fair market value).288 The provision also provided a full exemption for
up to $10,000 of property transferred.289 Despite these carve-outs (or perhaps
because of them), the provision was quickly deemed unworkable, and its
effective date was postponed to 1980,290 and then ultimately repealed in 1980
with retroactive effect.291 Industry groups, professional organizations, and even
the tax bar put strong pressure on Congress for repeal during that period.292
Ultimately, the complaints about complexity and workability won the day and
preserved this large benefit for owners of wealth.
Importantly for our theory and approach,293 the 1976 attempted reform
reveals how the combination of incremental congressional action and nonaction
often tilts in favor of nontaxation of deferred tax liabilities. As a part of the
compromise to enact the carryover basis provision, Congress also increased the
estate tax exemption, from $60,000 to $120,000,294 under the reasonable
argument that much of that property would instead come under the income tax
umbrella due to the carryover basis provision. But when the carryover basis
provision was repealed, the higher estate tax exemption was kept in place—the
whole effort thus ended up being a net benefit to wealthy taxpayers.295 By
286. See Zelenak, supra note 280, at 40–42.
287. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005(a)(2), 90 Stat. 1520, 1872–76 (repealed).
288. Id. (defining “carryover basis property” in the proposed § 1023(b)(2) and setting a $60,000
minimum basis in the proposed § 1023(d)).
289. Id. (proposing § 1023(b)(3)).
290. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat. 2763, 2884 (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1014, 1015, 1016, 1023).
291. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stat. 229, 299–301
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
292. See Zelenak, supra note 280, at 50–51; Howard J. Hoffman, The Role of the Bar in the Tax
Legislative Process, 37 TAX L. REV. 411, 442–48 (1982).
293. See supra Section III.A.
294. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2001(c)(1)(J) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (gradually increasing the filing exemption amount from $120,000 in 1977 to $175,000 in 1980);
see Zelenak, supra note 280, at 45–46; Eileen Shanahan, Advocates of Tax Reform Win Victories in House
Committee and in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/07/22/
archives/advocates-of-tax-reform-win-victories-in-house-committee-and-in.html [https://perma.cc/36
AS-527G (dark archive)].
295. See Darien B. Jacobsen, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and
Counting, 27 SOI BULL. 118, 122 fig.D (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07sumbul.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HGB5-YXKS] (showing ever-increasing exemption amounts).
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immediately granting the estate tax break, but delaying the income tax increase,
Congress had left open the door for the ultra-wealthy to undermine the latter
while keeping the former. In contrast, a current-assessment reform that did not
defer the tax increase could have been more stable and might have avoided that
perverse result.
The next (and only other) major attempt to repeal the step-up in basis
came under the Bush tax cuts in 2001, which also provided for a slow phaseout
and then repeal of the estate tax.296 When the estate tax was fully repealed in
2010, a new partial carryover basis provision, § 1022, was to take effect—partial,
because each decedent was entitled to $1,300,000 of aggregate basis increase,
which could be spread among the various property in the estate.297 Recognizing
the original connection between the estate tax and the step-up in basis
provision, the general consensus at the time continued to be that the two should
come and go together,298 and so the price of estate tax repeal was also repeal of
the basis step-up and the institution of a carryover basis regime.
Because the Bush tax cuts were passed using budget reconciliation, and
therefore under the “Byrd Rule” could not raise deficits in years outside the
ten-year budget window,299 the estate tax was scheduled to come back in full
force in 2011, along with § 1014. The hope of Congressional Republicans in 2001
was that a future Congress would make the estate tax repeal permanent,300 but
that did not happen. As a result, § 1022 would have only been in force for one
year, 2010. Even that was too much, though, and the provisions were instead
repealed.301 However, estates of those who died during 2010 could still elect to
forgo both the estate tax and the step-up in basis—again illustrating the headsI-win-tails-you-lose nature of postenactment changes.302
The broader lesson here is that the income tax almost certainly cannot be
sustainably fixed just by calling for an end to stepped-up basis and the other
major loopholes that allow taxpayers to wipe out their deferred tax liabilities.
Even if these reform attempts were to be enacted, why should we expect them
to be sustained? Both theory and history strongly suggest the opposite. Even if
296. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501(a),
115 Stat. 38, 69 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 2210, 2664).
297. Id. § 542(a), 115 Stat. at 76–77 (repealed) (proposing § 1022(b)).
298. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 23 (2005). Proponents of estate tax repeal today seem to
have ridded themselves of the need to have a consistent approach to these policies. Major estate tax
repeal proposals no longer included a repeal of § 1014 and institution of carryover basis. See, e.g., Death
Tax Repeal Act of 2019, S. 215, 116th Cong. (2019).
299. See Aprill & Hemel, supra note 213, at 101.
300. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 298, at 158–59.
301. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-312, § 301(a), 124 Stat. 3296, 3300 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
302. Id. § 301(c) (codified in 26 U.S.C. § 2001 note (Special Election with Respect to Estates of
Decedents Dying in 2010)).
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the major loophole benefits were to be ended, absent an accompanying currentassessment reform, ultra-wealthy taxpayers would just continue to defer their
tax liabilities while lobbying for the loopholes to be restored (or perhaps for
new loopholes to come into effect), and these efforts by the ultra-wealthy would
ultimately win the day.
CONCLUSION
Parts I and II of this Article explained how the existing U.S. income tax is
broken, especially with respect to the ultra-wealthy, and with many harmful
consequences. Part III then argued that, because of the political-optionality
benefit of deferral, only current-assessment reforms are likely to succeed at
repairing the income tax or otherwise fixing the personal tax system. Together,
these parts thus established the case for why a current-assessment reform is
needed: the only way to effectively tax today’s income (or, alternatively, today’s
accumulations of wealth or of spending power) is to tax it today.
This still leaves the question of how. How does one effectively impose a
currently-assessed tax on investment income? We do not mean to minimize the
challenges involved, although we will note again that there are already proposals
in the literature that we think would do a reasonable job of addressing these
challenges while enacting current-assessment reforms.303
Advocates for future-assessment reforms or for maintaining the current
tax system typically object to these current-assessment reform proposals by
citing some combination of: (a) the administrative difficulties of taxing the
accrued income from hard-to-value assets, (b) concerns about taxpayers having
sufficient liquidity to pay periodic taxes, and (c) worries about the
constitutionality of some federal-level current-assessment approaches that
might be at risk of being considered “direct taxes.”304 Most of all, the opponents
of current-assessment reforms have argued that alternative future-assessment
approaches to reform are good enough, so there is no need to deal with these
challenges.
We hope we have dealt with this latter complaint by explaining why
future-assessment taxes are emphatically not good enough. But the former
complaints remain—how do we deal with the problems of valuation, of
liquidity, and of constitutionality?
With respect to the ultra-wealthy, we view liquidity as mostly a nonissue.
If current-assessment reforms are directed at the ultra-wealthy, then reformers

303. See supra notes 32–33.
304. For discussion of concerns related to constitutionality and “direct taxes,” see John R. Brooks
& David Gamage, The Indirect Tax Canon, Apportionment, and Drafting a Constitutional Wealth Tax 5–7
(Ind. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 459, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3910717 [https://perma.
cc/6BHW-2Q8C].
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need not be much concerned about whether there are sufficient liquid assets to
pay an annual tax on unrealized income. Arguably, there may be limited
exceptions, but in those very limited scenarios in which liquidity may still be a
significant concern with respect to some ultra-wealthy taxpayers (such as
perhaps the founders of start-up companies), it is not overly difficult to build
mechanisms into current-assessment reforms for resolving liquidity concerns in
those specific scenarios.305
The constitutionality and valuation challenges are potentially more
vexing, but scholarship on both issues has advanced considerably in recent
years306 such that, in our view, neither are insurmountable barriers. We will
have more to say about both of these topics in subsequent work, but we hope
that this Article also serves as a research agenda and a call-to-arms for tax
scholars and reform advocates to continue to push forward to develop further
innovative solutions.
Despite decades of endless discussions and tax reform efforts, the
realization doctrine and the ability to defer income—the “Achilles’ heel” of our
tax system—remain, eroding the fundamental fairness and effectiveness of our
tax system and of our political economy more generally. We think that a major
reason for this is that tax scholars and reform advocates have failed to appreciate
the need for current-assessment reform. We have thus argued both that
developing better current-assessment reform proposals should be at the top of
the agenda for tax policy scholars and that pushing for the enactment of some
approach for current-assessment reform should be at the top of the agenda for
tax reform advocates.
Substantial tax reforms are hard to pass, so if the next major tax reform
legislation fails to enact current assessment, we may not get another shot in our
lifetimes. We thus urge any tax reform coalition desiring to increase taxes on
the ultra-wealthy to prioritize current-assessment reforms. It might be
worthwhile to simply hike income tax rates on the ultra-wealthy while retaining
the realization doctrine or to enact future-assessment tax reforms, if that is the
only politically feasible option. But we doubt that any such reform could
succeed at sustainably fixing the ways in which the tax system is broken with
respect to the ultra-wealthy. As we have argued, for a lasting solution, current-

305. For instance, many of the current-assessment reform proposals listed in notes 32–33
incorporate such mechanisms.
306. For drafts of our views as to how a federal wealth tax or other current-assessment reform
could be designed to ensure its constitutionality, see generally Brooks & Gamage, supra note 304; John
R. Brooks & David Gamage, Why a Wealth Tax Is Definitely Constitutional (Jan. 9, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3489997 [https://perma.cc/7VPQ-C287]. For
early drafts of some of our proposals for resolving valuation issues in designing a wealth tax or other
current-assessment reform, see Gamage, Five Key Research Findings, supra note 28, at app. A; see also
supra notes 32–33.
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assessment reforms are needed. We should aim to tax now, or we may ultimately
tax never.
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